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**Volume 202**

*Soliloquy in Japanese and English*

by Yoko Hasegawa

Yoko Hasegawa
University of California, Berkeley

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Preface

My thanks to the 24 Japanese and 10 English participants who volunteered as subjects for the data-gathering related to this project. Without their assistance, this book could not have materialized. Throughout this research, I have become increasingly fascinated by hearing other persons’ soliloquies. Indeed, when I transcribed my subjects’ soliloquies, I felt very close to them – a kind of feeling I had never previously experienced. This is one of the powers of soliloquy. Revealing one’s thoughts without interpersonal linguistic devices is a manifestation of trust. I appreciate my subjects’ trust and their forthright words, including criticism of my experiment and of my office possessions, as well as of their personal problems.

My interest in soliloquy was originally triggered by the works of the late Professor Shige-Yuki Kuroda. He cautioned that many proposed characteristics of linguistic expressions could be derived from communicative settings themselves, and were not necessarily properties of such expressions. I remember in particular his claim that if the selection of wa and ga (Japanese particles to mark the topic and the grammatical subject, respectively) is determined solely by the consideration of communication (e.g., whether the entity is given or new, identifiable or not to the addressee), their behaviors in soliloquy and dialogue must be quite different. I wanted to cite this statement in this book, but I was unable to find the source. When I asked Prof. Kuroda in 2008 in which of his works it appeared, he responded that he was not sure it was his. Well, I’m sure it was. No one else could make such an insightful comment.

I also would like to express my appreciation to the following individuals for their valuable comments and suggestions: Isja Conen, Anita Fetzer, Yukio Hirose, Ashlyn Moehle, Russell Lee-Goldman, Wesley Y. Leonard, Eve Sweetser, Yukinori Takubo, Helen Rippl Wheeler, and two anonymous referees.
chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Soliloquy for linguistic investigation

Language has long been recognized as an instrument of communication and thought. The research exploring language for communication is enormous, and our knowledge of diverse linguistic devices for communicating effectively has advanced significantly in recent decades. By contrast, in empirical research, exploration of language as a tool for thinking is scarce, with the study of private speech in psychology a notable exception, e.g. Kohlberg et al. 1968, Berk and Garvin 1984, Bivens and Berk 1990, Díaz and Berk 1992.

The Japanese language is equipped with numerous markers of interactional functions that many languages have not lexicalized or grammaticized, e.g. evidentials, extended use of donatory verbs (agera, karera, morau), honorifics, interpersonal particles, certain modality expressions, and situation-sensitive addressing terms. For this reason, Japanese has for many decades been a focus of attention, especially in the field of pragmatics.

A decade ago, I began to wonder what Japanese would look like if such interactional layers were removed, i.e. when it is used to express thought without communicative intent. I then embarked on a study of soliloquy (Hasegawa 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, Hirose and Hasegawa 2010). I collected spoken soliloquy data experimentally and transcribed and analyzed them with respect to specific linguistic features.

*Soliloquy in Japanese and English* is a systematic presentation of the outcome of my studies of soliloquy, as they progressed, as a contribution to linguistics in general. It deals with the topics to which analyses of soliloquy data are particularly relevant: the sentence-final particles ne and yō (Chapter 2), deixis and anaphora (Chapter 3), gendered speech (Chapter 4), linguistic politeness (Chapter 5), and the use of the second person pronoun you in soliloquy in English (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 consists of a summary of the findings with additional commentary. The Appendix provides transcription conventions used in this book and a list of abbreviations used in the glosses. Unless otherwise stated, I have rendered all English translations of Japanese sentences.
Soliloquy is the utterance of one's thoughts without addressing another individual. This notion of soliloquy will be elaborated with respect to the data utilized in this book in Section 1.4. It is sometimes conceived of as talking to oneself, inasmuch as many researchers consider that speech and thought are always dialogic, e.g. Watson 1925, Mead 1934, Peirce 1960, Bakhtin 1984. That is, even in soliloquy the speaking-self and the talked-to-self always exist, and they invariably mirror normal conversational exchanges. Mead (1934:141), for example, takes it for granted that "The very process of thinking is, of course, simply an inner conversation ...," while Peirce (1960:4.6) writes:

"... thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue – a dialogue between different phases of the ego – so that, being dialogical, it is essentially composed of signs, as its matter, in the sense in which a game of chess has the chessmen for its matter."

(Emphasis original)

Bakhtin’s (1984:86) dialogism is another example of this conception in which all human discourse is recognized as a complex thread of dialogic interrelationships with other utterances. He contends:

"Each person’s inner world and thought has its stabilized social environment which comprises the environment in which reasons, motives, values and so on are fashioned. ... In point of fact, word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As a word it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addressee and addressee. Each and every word expresses ‘the one’ in relation to the ‘other’. I give myself verbal shape from another’s point of view of the community to which I belong."

Therefore, words are always "half someone else’s," always reflecting the semantic intentions of another person (Bakhtin 1981:293).

However, even if soliloquy is essentially dialogic, there may well be profound differences between soliloquy and dialogic conversations. For example, if the speaker and addressee are identical (i.e. two sides of the same person), there is no gap or discrepancy in the interlocutors’ beliefs, assumptions, and relevant background knowledge; therefore, the speaker is not obligated to provide special consideration concerning the addressee’s knowledge and perspective, and, as a result, the information structure of soliloquy inevitably differs from those of normal dyadic conversations. As a further example, we could easily speculate on the absence of linguistic politeness in soliloquy because the speaker does not need to consider the possibility of threatening the addressee’s self-esteem (i.e. "face"). One might in soliloquy say things to hurt oneself, but no linguistically polite expressions would likely mitigate such harm.

It has been said that Japanese provides no "neutral form" with respect to the social context, e.g. Jovden and Noda 1987, Matsumoto 1988. That is, the use of honorifics indexes a certain interpersonal stance, and their absence indexes not a neutral, but another stance. Could this fact indicate that neutral expressions are impossible in Japanese even in soliloquy? This and many other interesting questions ensue.

Analyzing language that is used in non-canonical settings can be not only intellectually inspirational, but also instrumental in achieving a deeper understanding of canonical uses of language. We should be aware, for instance, that some characteristics found in communicative uses of language could be derived from the communicative setting itself, rather than the properties of the expressions under investigation (Kuroda 1979/1992:93; see Chapter 3 for pertinent discussions). By providing valuable data for examination of how, and possibly why, linguistic structures differ between communicative and non-communicative settings, studies of soliloquy will foster further progress in our understanding of the nature of language and its uses. I therefore advocate in-depth investigation of soliloquy as the articulation of thought as a new approach to linguistic research.


Most native speakers of Japanese feel such phrases as A, soo nan daa ‘Oh, I see’ to be soliloquy.3 By contrast, speakers of English usually do not have the same clarity of distinction. When asked whether a phrase such as Oh/Ab/Hub, I see is in dialogue or soliloquy, many get puzzled, and their answers vary considerably. This difference is likely due to the fact that the soliloquy mode of discourse has been grammaticalized to some extent in Japanese, but less so in English.

Understandably, therefore, soliloquy appears to play a more significant role in Japanese, although it certainly has pragmatic significance in both languages. For

1. The term soliloquy is frequently used interchangeably with monologue. However, monologue is also commonly used to refer to a speech by one person addressing an audience. This paper employs the term soliloquy to avoid confusion.

2. The validity of this claim depends on how thought is defined. If we recognize multiplicity of thought, it is highly unlikely that all kinds of thought are dialogic.

3. Other examples typically interpreted as soliloquy by native speakers are: Honoo daroo ka ‘I wonder if it’s true’, Naruhodo ne ‘That makes sense’, Ganbaru zo ‘I’ll make it, no matter what.’
example, consider the following scenario: A customer is in a check-out line, and a clerk is ringing up purchases. The clerk announces the total amount, and the customer notices and points out that the clerk rang up one item twice. The clerk (who is just finishing a 12-hour shift and clearly weary) shakes his head slightly and, without making eye contact with the customer, says, *I need to go home.* He then faces the customer and says, *I'm sorry.* In this case almost everyone would recognize *I need to go home* as soliloquy. Its significance here is to get the customer to recognize the speaker’s hard work while not directly complaining, which would be inappropriate and risky.

As seen in this brief episode, soliloquy can be used in order to be heard, although it is not meant to address anybody. It is used for *showing* one’s thoughts, not *telling* them. Using soliloquy in this manner requires adroit mental acrobatics, making a metapragmatic switch from the dialogue mode to soliloquy mode. We will delve into this topic when we discuss linguistic politeness in Chapter 5.

Soliloquy offers a potential abundance of precious, even critical, data, and yet, to my knowledge, no extensive work has ever been done on it in the field of linguistics. (As mentioned above, psychologists have investigated soliloquy as private speech, but they are typically focusing on child utterances.) In this book, I examine experimentally-obtained soliloquy data and discuss the validity of previously proposed analyses for several domains of linguistic investigation.

The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 1.2 provides a brief outline of the study of private speech. Although this book is not an attempt to investigate private speech as it is studied within the paradigm of psychology, it is nevertheless beneficial to familiarize ourselves with some concepts and findings available in the literature of private speech. As mentioned above, soliloquy has rarely been focused upon in linguistics. However, some researchers find that it is sometimes advantageous, even mandatory, to remove an addressee from discourse. Therefore, studies claiming certain utterances to be soliloquy are occasionally encountered. Section 1.3 presents several such works in Japanese linguistics. Section 1.4 introduces the experimentally-obtained soliloquy data that will be investigated and reported throughout this book. Section 1.5 summarizes this chapter.

### 1.2 Private speech

This section briefly outlines previous study of soliloquy in the field of psychology. It introduces the concepts of *egocentric speech* (Section 1.2.1), *crib speech* (Section 1.2.3), and *self-talk* (Section 1.2.4), as well as two categorizations of private speech (Section 1.2.2).

#### 1.2.1 Egocentric speech

The scientific study of soliloquy was originated by Piaget (1923/2002), who observed kindergarten children ages three to five talking to themselves as if thinking aloud. For example, a child sitting alone at his table said, "I want to do that drawing, there... I want to draw something, I do. I shall need a big piece of paper to do that" (2002:15). Piaget named this phenomenon *egocentric speech*, arguing that such soliloquies were due to young children's cognitive immaturity. That is, while communicating with others, they are unable to take the addressee’s perspective into consideration, and thus, their utterances are often incoherent and incomprehensible to others. Children frequently employ, for instance, deixis and pronouns without clear referents. However, they typically are indifferent as to whether or not the hearer understands their speech. Therefore, egocentric speech can be categorized as a kind of autistic activity.

Piaget posited three categories of egocentric speech: *repetition, monologue,* and *collective monologue*. In repetition, the child imitates words and syllables just for “the pleasure of talking, with no thought of talking to anyone, nor even at times of saying words that will make sense. This is a remnant of baby prattle, obviously devoid of any social character” (p. 9). Monologue, according to Piaget, is an instance of thinking aloud, without addressing anyone (p. 10). In collective monologue, the child talks aloud to him/herself in front of others, in which “the point of view of the other person is never taken into account; his presence serves only as a stimulus” (p. 10). That is, children may appear to be engaged in conversation, but each is merely talking to him/herself. The following is a conversation between two five-year-old boys (Okamoto 1985:42):

1. **A:** *Kinoo Shinkansen notta 20,4*  
   *rode sfp*
   *I rode a Shinkansen bullet train yesterday.***

2. **B:** *Otoosan wo na, tsuri e itan ya.*  
   *father with intj fishing to went sfp*  
   *I went fishing with my dad.*

3. **A:** *Hikari-goo monosuqoo hayai de.*  
   *very fast sfp*
   *The Hikari train is very fast.*

---

4. This book transcribes Japanese sentences using a modified Hepburn system of Romanization, in which long vowels are marked by a repetition of the vowels, e.g., *shoooota* ‘novel’. In the original Hepburn system, the moraic nasal /n/ is written as *m* before *[p, b, m]*, e.g., *sumpo* ‘awake’, *shinbun* ‘newspaper’, *jimmyado* ‘personal connections’. In this book, however, /n/ is written uniformly as *n*, not as *m*. The abbreviations are listed in the appendix.
hypothesized that during the early school years, the development of inner speech stabilizes, and, as a consequence, private speech ebbs away.

To support his view that private speech is social in its origins, Vygotisky reported that the amount of their private speech reduced to almost none when children were placed in a group of deaf and mute or foreign children (pp. 233–234).8

Vygotisky argued that private speech serves self-direction and self-guidance functions; therefore, its frequency should increase significantly when an obstacle is introduced into children’s activities. He theorized that in the early stage private speech follows an action to express an afterthought or comment on it. It then appears simultaneously with the child’s activity. In the final stage, private speech appears before the action and serves a self-regulatory function. As an example of this final stage, Vygotisky provided the situation in which a child, ready to draw, suddenly found that something needed was missing. The child would then try to comprehend and to remedy the situation by talking to himself: “Where’s the pencil? I need a blue pencil. Never mind, I’ll draw with the red one and wet it with water; it will become dark and look like blue” (pp. 29–30). Some of the subjects in my experiment also reported that they tended to soliloquize when they encountered a difficult problem and attempted to resolve it.

Regarding formal properties of private speech, Vygotisky assumed that as private speech develops into internal thought, it becomes more and more abbreviated and cryptic. He speculated that, whereas syntactic constituents are more thoroughly expressed in social speech, inner speech consists solely of predicates because the topic of an utterance (typically encoded as the grammatical subject) is already known to the speaker. In other words, private speech is initially similar to social speech, but it is gradually restructured toward the syntax of inner speech. Although this is certainly a commonsensical hypothesis, it has not been verified by experimental studies (Berk 1992). Between ages four and eight, private speech tends to be more fragmented than social speech, but it does not become increasingly fragmented. Rather, private speech becomes longer and more complex with increasing age (Feigenbaum 1992).

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5. Vygotisky (1934/1986) sees thought and language as having different roots, but they eventually combine. Language guides and drives thought on.

6. Although undoubtedly a minority, an opposite view also exists: Steiner (1975: 125) speculates, “It may be – I will argue so – that communication outward is only a secondary, socially stimulated phase in the acquisition of language. Speaking to oneself would be the primary function...”

7. According to Girbau (1996: 511), Flavell (1966) is responsible for the term private speech.

---

8. Today, Vygotisky’s idea is more widely subscribed to by researchers than is Piaget’s as presented above. However, Piaget later worked in a direction closer to Vygotisky in crucial aspects. For example, Flavell (1962) agrees with Vygotisky that the early function of language is communicative, but he nonetheless points out that Vygotisky’s concept of socialization is ambiguous. Piaget argues if one wrongly believes that the other person thinks in the same way and does not manage to understand the other point of view, it is a kind of social behavior, but such behavior is not intellectual co-operation. He defends his stance by stating that he has always recognized that children think they are talking to others and making themselves understood. By egocentrism, he means the lack of the ability to shift mental perspective to others.
Although Vygotsky’s hypothesis regarding sentence fragmentation does not accurately capture the reality in language development, abbreviated utterances in adult speech do sometimes convey the nuances of soliloquy. Zwicky (2005) reports that the omission of *it be* in the extrapolation construction sounds like self-reflection, e.g. (2).

(2) a. Odd that Mary never showed up.
   b. Too bad (that) she had to leave town so soon.
   c. Amazing that he didn’t spot the error.

Zwicky also reports Eve Clark’s observation, “I think it’s something of a convention in writing that one uses a lot more ellipsis to convey ‘internal feelings, attitudes’. Does this spill over to actual spoken usage?” I noted earlier in this chapter that, compared with Japanese, English has fewer formal indications of soliloquy; however, this might simply be due to lack of understanding or soliloquy. Soliloquy in English may have various subtle, yet to be discovered cues. This issue will be taken up as a subject of discussion in Chapter 6.

Vygotsky hypothesized that private speech quickly disappears at the beginning of school age when the development of inner speech stabilizes. In accordance with this hypothesis, the amount of private speech drops around the third grade, when children first begin to whisper instead of speaking aloud (Beauducel 1973). A high frequency of private speech is often correlated with high task performance up until the first grade, but around the third grade, its frequent use becomes associated with lower scores (Bivens and Berk 1990). Also, children with the highest IQs produce the greatest amount of private speech in first grade, yet the least amount in third (Berk 1986). That is, private speech is an advantage when children begin to use it, but as they grow older, it becomes a disadvantage (Kronk 1994).

While it is true that, with the passage of time, private speech gradually becomes less noticeable, this does not guarantee that children stop producing it, as Vygotsky speculated. In today’s society, private speech is so stigmatized that we may become embarrassed if caught while soliloquizing. Private speech by elderly persons is frequently regarded as a form of self-defense against stress or as a sign of withdrawal from the social world (Iredale 1992). Most children become aware of this social inhibition and gradually relinquish private speech in the presence of others. Nevertheless, private speech does continue throughout an individual’s lifetime (John-Steiner 1992). It becomes more challenging only for researchers using traditional methods of study in psychology to observe it (Diaz 1992).

9. Russell Lee-Goldman drew my attention to Zwicky’s blog entry.

1.2.2 Categories of private speech

Kohlberg et al. (1968) studied private speech in natural and experimental settings. They have found that (i) mental (rather than chronological) age, IQ, and task difficulty are the factors that influence the production of private speech, and (ii) private speech has a curvilinear course of development (i.e., rising and then declining), supporting Vygotsky’s claim, rather than Piaget’s contention that it declines monotonically with cognitive and social maturity. They posit six categories of private speech at five levels of developmental hierarchy (pp. 707–708).

Table 1. Development of private speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Presocial Self-stimulating Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wool play and repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repeating words, phrases, or sounds for their own sake, e.g. &quot;A what, a what. Dooodo, round up in the sky.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Outward-directed Private Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Remarks addressed to non-human objects, e.g. &quot;Get back there,&quot; addressed to a piece of sticky paper clinging to the child’s finger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description of one’s own activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remarks about the self’s activity which communicate no information to the listener, i.e. describing aspects of the self’s activity which are visible to the other person, whose attention does not need to be directed or monitored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Similar to Piaget’s category of collective monologue)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Inward-directed or Self-guiding Private Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Questions answered by the self, e.g. &quot;Do you know why we wanted to do that? Because I need it to go a different way?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-guiding comments, e.g. &quot;The wheels go here. We need to start it all over again,&quot; similar to Piaget’s category of monologue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>External Manifestations of Inner Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inaudible muttering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statements uttered in such a low voice that they are indecipherable to an auditor close by.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Silent Inner Speech or Thought</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Finding Kohlberg et al.’s categorization to be inadequate when applied to their own data, Berk and Garvin (1984) propose another categorization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. *Egocentric communication:* a failed attempt at communication, e.g. asking a question, due to the lack of adaptation to the listener’s perspective.
2. *Affect expression:* expression of emotions not directed at any particular individual, e.g. a child is handed a new box of crayons by the teacher and says to no one, "Wow! Neat!"
3. **Word play and repetition**: e.g., saying as he looks around the room, "Lolly, lolly, away! Un, un, un, un." (Kohlberg et al's Level 1)

4. **Fantasy play**: role playing or sound-effect verbalizations produced for objects, e.g., the roar of an airplane or the bang of a gun.

5. **Remarks addressed to nonhuman objects**: e.g., saying "Get out of my way!" to a chair after he bumps into it. (Kohlberg et al's Level 2)

6. **Description of one's own activity and self guidance**: e.g., counting her fingers, a child says, "Seven, eight, nine, ten. It's ten." (Kohlberg et al's Level 2)

7. **Self-answered questions**: e.g., glancing through a dictionary, a child says, "Now, where do I find this?" and immediately responds, "I know, I know, under 'C'!" (Kohlberg et al's Level 3)

8. **Reading aloud**: e.g., a child begins to sound out a name that initially seems difficult for him to read, "Sher-lock! Holm-lock!"

9. **Inaudible muttering**: (Kohlberg et al's Level 4)

Berk and Garvin found that their experimental results do not show a correlation between their categories and Kohlberg et al's developmental hierarchy.

1.2.3 Crib speech

A child begins to produce utterances to the self by age one and a half when they are left alone in the dark before falling asleep (Berk 1992: 28). This early-age, pre-sleep soliloquy is referred to as crib speech, which lasts until children reach approximately three years of age. Crib speech was first investigated by Weir (1962), with her two-and-a-half year old son, Anthony, as subject. She placed a microphone on a chair in Anthony's bedroom and recorded his crib speech for several months. Anthony's play with words often sounded like systematic language-learning exercises, e.g.:

(a) Block - Yellow block - Look at all the yellow block. (p. 82)

(b) What color - What color blanket - What color mop - What color glass. (p. 109)

(c) One two three four - One two three four - One two three - Anthony counting - Good boy you - One two three. (p. 112)

(d) Bobo [a stuffed toy] has a hat - Take off the hat - Hat for Anthony and Bobo - For Bobo, not for Anthony - Hat for Anthony. (p. 135)

Weir noted that imperatives are the most-frequently occurring sentence type, followed by declaratives and then interrogatives. Regarding speech length, the most common are two- and three-word sentences; four and five-word sentences exhibit a considerable drop-off; six-word sentences are rare; no true sentences occur beyond the seven-word length. Anthony's crib speech vocabulary is very limited as compared with his daytime lexical capacity. The toy Bobo is most frequently mentioned, followed by blanket, his favorite object. Regarding descriptive adjectives, color terms are most widespread, as is the lexeme go among the verbs. The grammatical paradigms, e.g., the past tense, are rigorously practiced, e.g., Bobo, go take off the hat - Bobo took off the hat (p. 73).

Weir concluded that crib speech is dialogic because:

"... he [Anthony] becomes his own interlocutor and produces the equivalent of a dialogue spoken by a single person. He can switch roles in this interchange readily - he asks a question and provides the answer, he performs a linguistic task and commends himself on the accomplishment, he produces a linguistic event and explicitly corrects himself. The importance of the conative [volition, desire] function as shown by the great number of imperatives, supports clearly the premise of a social aspect of this vocalized inner speech as Vygotsky [1934/1986] has suggested it, or as Peirce [1960] has characterized thought." (p. 146)

1.2.4 Self-talk

Another term in affinity with private speech is self-talk. It refers to the use of self-directed statements to control one's behavior. Whereas the use of the term private speech is normally restricted to children's soliloquy, self-talk is used to refer to adults' soliloquy as well. Meichenbaum (1977), inspired by the reports that private speech facilitates task performance, introduced self-talk to cognitive behavior therapy. He asked children to say "push" or "don't push" in response to a signal light and then act accordingly. The results showed that hyperactive, impulsive-behavior children have less verbal control of nonverbal behavior than cognitively reflective children. For example, impulsive children would often say "don't push" but then push the button (p. 25). He found that the private speech of children in these two categories does not differ in quantity, but does differ remarkably in quality. Soliloquies of impulsive children consist mostly of Kohlberg et al's Level 1 (self-stimulatory) speech (see Section 1.2.2), whereas those of reflective children manifest Levels 2–4, indicating a more instrumental, self-guiding manner (p. 28).

Following this discovery, he and his colleagues began self-instructural training using self-talk. For instance, in a task involving copying line patterns, the trainer, while performing the task, says to him/herself:

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10. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy is a form of psychotherapy that emphasizes the important role of thinking in how one feels and what one does – National Association of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapists.
“Okay, what is it I have to do? You want me to copy the picture with the different lines. I have to go slowly and carefully. Okay, draw the line down, down, good; then to the right, that’s it; now down some more and to the left. Good, I’m doing fine so far. Remember, go slowly. Now back up again. No, I was supposed to go down. That’s okay. Just erase the line carefully ... Good. Even if I make an error I can go on slowly and carefully. I have to go down now. Finished. I did it!”

(Meichenbaum and Goodman 1971:117)

Self-talk has been used to improve performance of a variety of tasks, e.g. sport training (Halliwell 1990, Kendall et al. 1990) and in teacher education (Payne and Manning 1990). It is also reported to be effective in calming passengers who are nervous about flying (Rosin and Nelson 1983).

Another area in which the self-regulatory function of soliloquy is investigated extensively is adult second language (L2) acquisition, where the term private speech is commonly used, rather than self-talk. The basic tenet is:

“[Language learning] begins with the environment of the classroom, moving to understanding the nature of the learner’s interface with that environment, and finally considering how internalization processes function to transform social interactive processes into the individual cognitive processes that we recognize as what it means for a person to ‘know’ a language.” (Ohta 2001:2)

Researchers in L2 acquisition investigate how private speech functions in this process. Frawley and Lantolf (1985) found that adult L2 learners revert to the use of private speech in the L2 to gain self-regulation. In their study, learners of intermediate proficiency used private speech in a manner similar in frequency, form, and function to children’s private speech in their native language. By contrast, the private speech of more advanced learners closely resembled its use by adult native speakers. Also, similar to the case of children, private speech emerges more frequently when adult L2 learners encounter a difficult problem, e.g. in picture-sequencing (Ahmad 1994) and recall of narrative and expository texts (Appel and Lantolf 1994). Ohta (2001) analyzed the private speech of native English speakers who were studying Japanese and found that seemingly silent L2 learners were neither passive nor disengaged, but, rather, involved actively in intrapersonal communication through private speech.

Table 2 summarizes the soliloquy-related terms introduced in this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Major work</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>egocentric speech</td>
<td>Piaget (1923/2002)</td>
<td>Young children’s autistic speech due to their cognitive immaturity. As the child’s cognitive maturity and social experiences grow, egocentric speech disappears.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private speech</td>
<td>Vygotsky (1934/1986)</td>
<td>A transitional phase in young children’s cognitive development from social communicative speech to inner speech (thought). They often think aloud because they have not yet learned to control their thoughts internally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inner speech</td>
<td>Vygotsky (1934/1986)</td>
<td>Subvocalized thought developed from social speech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crib speech</td>
<td>Weir (1962)</td>
<td>Infants’ nighttime talk before falling asleep between age one and a half and approximately three years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-talk</td>
<td>Meichenbaum (1977)</td>
<td>The use of self-directed statements to control one’s behavior.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Utility of soliloquy in linguistics research

Analyzing language used in non-canonical settings is often inspirational. Therefore, although soliloquy per se has not been treated as a focus of investigation in linguistics, a considerable number of studies have made use of soliloquial data. This section introduces several such studies.

1.3.1 Kuroda (1979/1992)

To my knowledge, Kuroda (1979/1992) was the first researcher to assign soliloquy data, albeit introspectively constructed, a pivotal role in linguistic investigation. He examined the use of Japanese demonstratives so-and a-in soliloquy and found examples counter to Kuno’s (1973) widely-accepted descriptions of these demonstratives. This topic will be considered in detail in Chapter 3.

1.3.2 Moriyama (1989)

Moriyama (1989) pays special attention to the addressee’s role in his study of the modality expression daroo, as exemplified in (4) (the translations of (4) are Moriyama’s; the translations of his other examples are mine).
(4) a. Hora, kare wa kita daroo.
   look he top came
   'Look! He came, didn’t he?'
 b. Kare wa tabun kita daroo.
   he top probably came
   'Perhaps, he came.'

In (4a) daroo to omou ‘I think that …’ cannot substitute for daroo, whereas in (4b) it can. Therefore, Moriyama argues, these two occurrences of daroo have different meanings, or functions. With (4a), the speaker solicits the addressee’s agreement, whereas (4b) simply gives the addressee the information that the conveyed event has possibly taken place.

Moriyama claims that all utterances either (i) assume that the addressee has relevant information, or (ii) do not assume such a condition. If (i) is the case, it would be unnatural to make the utterance when no addressee is present (i.e. anomalous as soliloquy); if (ii) is the case, the utterance could occur as soliloquy. The interjection hora ‘look’ indicates that (4a) assumes an addressee, but (4b) does not include any mark of interpersonal communication. Therefore, he concludes that daroo is sensitive to whether or not the addressee’s knowledge is taken into consideration by the speaker. If it is, daroo functions as a marker of a request for agreement; if not, it merely indicates probability.

Daroo can occur in interrogative sentences as well.

(5) a. Kono rooauto chikin wa oishii ka.
   this roast chicken top delicious q
   'Is the roast chicken served here delicious?'
 b. Kono rooauto chikin wa oishii daroo ka.
   this roast chicken top delicious q
   'I wonder if the roast chicken served here is delicious.'

Here, (5a) can be felicitously uttered only if the speaker believes that the addressee is familiar with the roast chicken served at that restaurant, but (5b) does not have such a precondition.

Generalizing his discovery, Moriyama characterizes daroo as an indicator of markedness. He considers the typical use of declaratives to be informing, paying no attention to the addressee’s knowledge. In such a case, daroo induces a marked interpretation, viz. consideration of the addressee’s knowledge and, in turn, whether or not the addressee agrees with the speaker. On the other hand, the typical use of interrogatives is to assume that the addressee has relevant information. In this case, the marked interpretation that daroo evokes is to discard the consideration of the addressee’s knowledge. Hence, the interpretation of doubt only in the speaker’s mind, as shown in (5b).

Moriyama contends that his analysis can be extended to apply to another modality expression, e.g. ja nai ka ‘is it not’, as well as to the sentence-final particle ne. His study does not explicitly utilize soliloquy data, however.

1.3.3 Nitta (1991)

The third work to be presented in this section is Nittā’s (1991) investigation of three Japanese constructions for expressing the speaker’s plans and intentions when they appear as a main predicate: shiyoo/shimashoo, suru, and suru tsamori da. Shiyoo and its polite variation shimashoo are commonly labeled as the presumptive form of the verb suru ‘do’, and because it has neither tense variation nor a negative counterpart, it is considered a pure modality expression. Suru is in the conclusive inflection, which normally expresses the nonpast tense and can be negated. Suru tsamori da is a combination of the conclusive form of the verb suru, the functional noun tsamori ‘intention’, and the conclusive form of the copula da, It permits both tense and negative variations.

These three constructions are frequently interchangeable, and the subtle differences among them resist succinct characterization. Nitta established that shimashoo (presumptive, 6a), yaroo (presumptive like shiyoo, 6b), suru (conclusive like suru, 6c), and iku (conclusive like suru, 6d) can be used in both dialogic and soliloquial discourse, but suru tsamori da (6e) requires the presence of an addressee, so that it cannot occur in soliloquy.

(6) a. O-okuri shimashoo.
   see-sb-home (rh) I’ll-do (presumptive)
   I’ll see you home. [Dialogue]
 b. Kyoo wa hitotsu haite-mite-yaroo.
   today top just-try I’ll-go-into (presumptive)
   ‘I’ll go there [e.g. a pub] today.’ [Soliloquy]
 c. Issho-ni itte-yaru.
   together go-give (conclusive)
   ‘I’ll come with you.’ [Dialogue]
 d. Ikkyuu-jishoku de iku zo.
   self-sufficient by go (conclusive) sfp
   ‘I’ll be self-sufficient!’ [Soliloquy]
e. *Dekiru dake no koto wa suru tsunomi da.*
   can as-much gen matter top intend-to-do
   'I'll do everything I can.' [Dialogue only]

Nitta proposes two diagnostic tests for dialogic and soliloquial modes of discourse: the *X to omou* ('I think that X') test and the *X to iu* ('I say that X') test. When an expression requires the presence of an addressee (e.g. *suru tsunomi da*), it cannot occur in *X to omou*, although it can freely occur in *X to iu*. Note that (7e) with *suru tsunomi da* is unacceptable, although its translation is acceptable.

(7) a.  *Hayaku kaero to omotta.*
   quickly go-home (presumptive) quot thought
   'I thought I'll go home immediately.'

b.  *Hayaku kaero to itta.*
   quickly go-home (presumptive) quot said
   'I said "let's go home now."'

c.  *Sono toki ore wa itsuka yatsu o to I top somedai that-guy acc nagatte-yaru to omotta.*
   beat-give (conclusive) quot thought
   'I thought I'll beat him up some day.'

d.  *Hiroshi ni ore wa itsuka yatsu o to I top somedai that-guy acc nagatte-yaru to itta.*
   beat-give quot said
   'I told Hiroshi I'll beat him up some day.'

e.  *#Ore wa ganbaru tsunomi da to omotta.*
   I top do-my-best quot thought
   'I thought I'll do my best.'

f.  *Ore wa ganbaru tsunomi da to itta.*
   I top do-my-best quot said
   'I said I'll do my best.'

It is well known that some linguistic expressions are interactional, inherently presupposing the existence of an addressee, e.g. (a) imperatives (e.g. *tomare Stop!*), (b) certain sentence-final particles (e.g. *za* 'I tell you'), (c) vocative expressions (e.g. *oow(oy) hey*), (d) responses (e.g. *hai* 'yes, ite 'no'), (e) pragmatic expressions of various kinds (e.g. *sumimasen ga excuse me, but* kokodake no hanashi dakedo 'it's between you and me'), (f) addressee honorifics (e.g. *desu/su

masu*), and (g) hearsay expressions (e.g. *da sooda da atte 'I hear that .'). This requirement can be explicated by the semantics of these expressions. It is interesting to note that such grammatical constructions as *suru tsunomi da* that are not so obviously interactional from their semantics alone nevertheless impose the same restriction. Indeed, my soliloquy data do not have any occurrences of *suru tsunomi da*.

1.3.4 Hirose (1995), Hasegawa and Hirose (2005)

Hirose (1995) contends that the speaker has two different aspects of self - public and private - and that the English and Japanese languages differ in the way those aspects are encoded in their lexicogrammatical systems. The public self is the speaker as the initiator of communication, facing an addressee or having one in mind. The private self is the speaker as the subject of thinking or consciousness, with no addressee in mind. The public self and private self appear in two different kinds of linguistic expression that he calls public expression and private expression, respectively. Public expression corresponds to the communicative function of language; private expression corresponds to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language.

Public expressions frequently, but not always, include interactional devices, or the addressee-oriented elements exemplified above. Addressee-oriented words or phrases appear exclusively in public expressions; conversely, clauses containing addressee-oriented items are public expressions. On the other hand, sentences that lack addressee-oriented items can be either public or private. For Hirose, when the speaker intends to communicate with another person, the expression is considered to be public; otherwise, it is private. In this framework, it is logical to expect that only (or primarily) private expressions occur in soliloquy.

While public expressions involve communicative intention, private expressions correspond to mental states. In Japanese, mental states are typically described by verbs like *omou* 'think. Omou and other mental-state verbs can take as their complement a reported clause marked by the quotative particle to. Descriptions of what one thinks, believes, doubts, or wishes are necessarily private expressions, and mental-state verbs allow only a private expression as their reported-clause complement. In the following examples, angle brackets represent private expressions, and square brackets represent public expressions.

11. The imperative expression *mate yo 'wait a second' can occur naturally in soliloquy, but it seems to be only the exception.
(8) a. Haruo wa <Priv ami ni chigaimai> to omotte-iru.
    top rain must quot is-thinking
    'Haruo thinks it must be raining.'

b. Haruo wa <Priv ami daran> to omotte-iru.
    top rain will
    'Haruo thinks it will be raining.'

(9) a. #Haruo wa [Pub ami da yo] to omotte-iru.
    top rain cop I-tell-you
    'Haruo thinks "It's raining, I tell you."' [Intended]

b. #Haruo wa [Pub ami desu] to omotte-iru.
    top rain cop (ah)
    'Haruo (politely) thinks "It's raining."' [Intended]

The sentences in (8) contain a private expression as their reported clause, which in turn includes a modal expression representing a mental state of certainty or conjecture. In (9), on the other hand, the items in bold-italic are addressee-oriented expressions, making the entire reported clauses public expressions. Because a public expression cannot be the complement of a mental-state verb, (9a, b) are anomalous.

Unlike mental-state verbs, utterance verbs such as in "say" allow either a public or private expression as their reported clause. The reported clauses in (10) are public expressions, considered direct discourse.

    top to rain cop I-tell-you
    quot said
    'Haruo said to Natsuko, "It's raining, I tell you."'

    top to rain cop (ah)
    'Haruo politely said to Natsuko, "It's raining."'

Haruo's belief that it is raining in (10) can also be reported as private expression, using indirect discourse, as in (11):

(11) Haruo wa Natsuko ni <Priv ami da> to itta.
    top to rain cop
    'Haruo told Natsuko that it was raining.'

Hirose contends that Japanese has a distinct word for the private self, viz. the reflexive pronoun jibun 'self', but lacks a word designated for the public self.

The public self is referred to by various words of self-reference, such as atashi (female-casual), boku (male-casual), ore (male-casual/vulgar), wakasuki (super formal), watashi (male-formal or female-formal/informal), or role names, such as okaasen 'mother', and sensei 'teacher', depending on the communicative situation. By contrast, English has the designated word "I" for the public self, but it lacks a special word for the private self. The private self in English is referred to by different personal pronouns, depending on gender and person, as shown in (12). (The unmarked use of jibun in (12) ensures the bracketed parts are private expressions.)

(12) a. Watashi wa <Priv jibun wa oyogenai > to itta.
    I top self top can't-swim quot said
    'I said that I can't swim.'

b. Kimi wa <Priv jibun wa oyogenai > to itta.
    you
    'You said that you can't swim.'

c. Ion/Mari wa <Priv jibun wa oyogenai > to itta.
    'John/Mary said that he/she can't swim.'

Metaphorically, the private self represented by jibun is the naked self, whereas various words of self-reference – e.g. boku, watashi, okaasan 'mother', and sensei 'teacher' – are diverse clothes for the private self to wear in public (Hasegawa and Hirose 2005:245).

It is worth pointing out that jibun can also be used to refer to the public self, as in (13):

(13) jibun wa sono koto ni toite wa nanimo shiri-masu.
    self top that matter about top anything know-not (ah)
    'I don't know anything about that matter.'

Because the addressee honorific -masen is used, (13) must be a public expression, and yet the use of jibun is acceptable. This marked use of jibun carries an unusual tone: it is as if the speaker is appearing in public without clothes. Thus, just as it is indecorous to appear naked in public, so too does the use of jibun to refer to the public self sounds peculiar. In fact, illustrations like (13) remind many Japanese of military life where soldiers are talking to their superiors, or of sports clubs where junior (= inferior) male members are talking to their senior (= superior) members. Probably in such situations it is tacitly assumed that one must show one's real self to one's superior or senior, to whom absolute loyalty is expected.
1.3.5 Tokui (1995)

Examining Japanese novels' female characters' utterances when they are alone (i.e. soliloquies), Tokui (1995) attempts to determine different effects on the reader when utterances contain so-called female language (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) and when they occur without it. She refers to those without female language as Type A, and those with it as Type B. She identifies 23 functional categories of such soliloquies, of which ten are illustrated below. (Her examples are slightly simplified; female expressions in Type B utterances are highlighted.)

(14) a. Self-encouragement, mutter with a sigh, a cry
   (A) Makeru mon  ka.
   lose  q
   'I won't be beaten!'  
   Yoisho-to,  
   oofo-quot  
   'Oof!'  
   Female language (B type) does not occur in this category.

b. Discovery
   (A) Anata atta.
   there-was  there-was  
   'Here it is!'  
   (B) Anata akari ga tuite iru wa.
   oh light nom is-on sfp  
   'Oh, the light is on!'  
   Wa is a feminine sentence-final particle (sfp).

c. Recollection
   (A) Soso ko ka.
   oh so q  
   'Oh, that's right!'  
   (B) Soso da wa. Toshika ano toki ni wa
   oh cop sfp surely that time at top
   daremo inakatan to da wa.
   anyone existed-not cop sfp
   'Oh, that's right. There was no one there at that time.'

d. Retrospection
   (A) Kodomo no koro, yoku koko de asonda-kke.
   child gen time often here at played-sfp
   'When I was a child, I used to play here often.'

(B) Ano koro wa tanoshikatta wa.
   that time top was-enjoyable sfp
   'I had a good time those days.'

e. Joy
   (A) Mikka mo yasumeru!
   3-days as-long-as can-rest  
   'I can take three days off!'  
   (B) Ureshii wa
   sfp  
   'I'm so happy!'  

f. Admiration
   (A) Sogo Sekai-shinkiroku da!
   great world-record cop  
   'Wow, it's a new world record!'  
   (B) Hontoo ni yoku ganbaru wa.
   really very keep-going sfp  
   'Her perseverance is really impressive!'  

g. Surprise
   (A) Aa, bikkuri-shita!
   oh stunned
   'I'm stunned!'  
   (B) Ironna katei ga aru no ne.
   various family nom exist nmlz sfp  
   'There are so many different types of families!'  

h. Anger
   (A) Mattaku nani o kangaten daro, saikin
   truly what acc is-thinking 1-wonder recent
   no otama wa!  
   gen adult top  
   'What are they thinking, those adults nowadays?'  
   (B) Kore o katazukere nante.
   this acc clean-up quot  
   'Do I have to clean up this mess?'

i. Perplexity
   (A) Maatta naa.
   troubled sfp  
   'It beats me.'
1.3.6 Washi (1997)

To analyze the sentence-final particles wa, na, and ne, Washi (1997) divides utterances into two types: interactional and soliloquial. She further subdivides them into:

(15) Interactional Utterances
I. By the initiator
   a. Conative utterance (requiring the addressee to deliver responses, e.g., question, order).
   b. Introducing a new topic into the conversation.
   c. Cutting into the ongoing conversation.
II. By the receiver
   a. Responding to a preceding conative utterance.
   b. Continuing the new topic introduced by the initiator.
   c. Responding to a soliloquy or an utterance that does not require a response.
III. Utterances that do not call for any action from the hearer, e.g., unilateral commentary about the hearer.

(16) Soliloquial Utterances (the speaker is not aware of the hearer’s presence)
I. Reacting to oneself, an interlocutor, or surroundings.
II. Reacting to what has occurred in mind.
III. Reacting to one’s own utterance.

According to Washi, na and ne are interchangeable in an initiator’s utterance in interactive discourse, (15-1), but they are not interchangeable in soliloquial utterances, (16). No generally lacks interactivity and expresses the speaker’s emotion and doubt without expecting the hearer’s response. Washi claims further that wa does not occur typically in initiator utterances. Compare (17) and (18).

(17) A: Ima made iromon Makabeu-fujin o mite kimashita until-now various Lady-Macbeth acc have-seen
     ga... wa Kurihara Komaki no geireki but that top gen repertoire
     ni zeki iretai.
to certainly want-to-put
     ‘I’ve seen many performances of Macbeth, but I really want to put Lady Macbeth in Komaki Kurihara’s repertoire.’
     B1: Watashi mo soo omomasu ne.
          I also so think sfp
          ‘I think so, too.’
     B2: Watashi mo soo omomasu wa.
Both *ne* (17-B1) and *wa* (17-B2) can be used in B's utterances and mark B's receptive position. By contrast, in (18), where A leads the flow of the conversation, *ne* (18-A1) can be used, but *wa* (18-A2) cannot be. Washi notes that *wa*'s lack of effecting the addressee's response, as shown in (18-A2), makes it suitable for its use in soliloquy.

(18) A1: *Are, anata wa amari odorokimasen ne.*
   'Oh, you top much not-get-surprised sfp
   'Oh, you aren't surprised.'

A2: #Are, anata wa amari odorokimasen wa.

B: *Tandemo nai, odoroita yo ...*
   absurd was-surprised sfp
   'You're wrong. I was surprised.'

It is interesting to note that Washi's definition of *hitorigoto 'soliloquy'* is very different from that used in the present book. She does not consider those utterances one makes in isolation *hitorigoto*. Rather, she applies the term *hitorigoto* only to those utterances that occur in the presence of a hearer, but with the speaker ignoring his/her presence. Surely soliloquy is utilized to be heard. This topic is discussed in Chapter 5 on linguistic politeness.

1.3.7 Moriyama (1997)

Moriyama's (1997) another work is unique in that it deals with soliloquy as the main focus of attention. According to Moriyama, soliloquy had not previously been investigated because, unlike the communicative use of language, non-communicative use was believed to lack elaborate linguistic devices. He discusses the kinds of sentences that would sound unnatural when no addressee is present.

Like Nitta (1991), presented above, Moriyama assumes that if an expression can occur in the quoted clause of *towomu* (1) think that, it can be uttered as soliloquy. He contends that those types of sentences listed in (19) cannot occur in soliloquy, whereas those in (20) can:

(19) a. #*Watsu* wa *kaeru* tsusori da.
   #I top go-home intend-to-do
   'I intend to go home.'

b. #*Moo sugu* kare wa *taku* to *omou.
   soon he top arrive quot think
   'I think he'll arrive soon.'

c. #*Kare* ga *kita* soo da.
   he nom came I-heard
   'I heard that he arrived.'

(20) a. *Kare* wa *nihonjin* da.
   he top Japanese cop
   'He's Japanese.'

b. *Ame* ga *yanda*.
   rain nom stopped
   'It stopped raining.'

c. *Kare* ga *kita* yoo da.
   he nom came it-seems
   'It seems he's arrived.'

He points out that, while non-linguistic thoughts can be processed in the brain in parallel fashion, linguistic thoughts must be processed linearly one at a time. He then hypotheses that to qualify as natural soliloquy, the sentence must express a progression of thoughts. That is, if the content of the expression is already activated in the speaker's brain, it is unlikely to be uttered because doing so does not progress his/her thought. He explains that all sentences in (19) are unnatural as soliloquy because the contents of the utterances are already obvious to the speaker, although reporting such contents to other people can be meaningful. Thus, such utterances can occur in dialogues. Although Moriyama does not elaborate on his idea of progression of thoughts thoroughly, this is an insightful hypothesis, which will be revisited in Chapter 6.

Moriyama's work is theoretical rather than empirical, as he cautions that his study is about the modality expressions as linguistic objects that can or cannot occur in soliloquy, not about sentences that actually occur in soliloquy.

1.3.8 Shinzato (2004)

Shinzato (2004) considers soliloquy when she investigates the semantic affinity of speech-act and mental-state verbs. Following Nakai's (1994:85) implicational relationship between pairs of these two types of verbs, illustrated in (21), she argues that mental-state verbs (e.g. *omou* 'think') depict the *internal reality* still in the private domain, while speech-act verbs (e.g. *iu* 'say') refer to the same reality made public, i.e. externally manifested.

(21) a. *I say/state/assert/claim/tell you (that)*
    ⊃ I believe (that)
b. I ask/inquire/question (wh-)
   ⊃ I wonder (wh-)

c. I promise (to do)
   ⊃ I intend (to do)

d. I order (you to do)
   ⊃ I want (you to do)

e. I confirm (that)
   ⊃ I know (that)

f. I deny (that)
   ⊃ I doubt (that)

Shintzō explains that the "X" of "I think X" and "I say X" both codify the internal reality, but they codify it differently. The "X" of "I think X" can be uttered in soliloquy, and thus it belongs to a private domain, whereas the "X" of "I say X" is used only in a dialogue, and thus it is in the public domain. She analyzes Ore wa itsuka yatsu o nazette-yaru 'I'll beat him up some day' in Nitta's (7c) as internally manifested, while Ore wa ganbaru tsuomori da 'I intend to do my best' in (7e) is manifested only externally. That is, at the level of framing, these two complements are qualitatively different (p. 866).

(7) c. Sono toki ore wa itsuka yatsu o that time I top someday that-guy acc nazette-yaru to omotta.

   beat-give (conclusive) quot thought
   'I thought I'll beat him up some day.'

e. #Ore wa ganbaru tsuomori da to omotta.

   I top do-my-best quot thought
   'I thought I'd do my best.'

She further argues that the same relationship can be observed in other sentence types: doubt in interrogatives and desire in imperatives.

"When they [doubts and desire] are recognized internally, they appear as the complements of the mental verbs in statements, self-inquiry in questions, and 'wish' in desideratives. In contrast, when they are externalized, they are realized as the complements of speech act verbs, other-inquiry, and command. Thinking, wondering, and wishing are not intended to be overheard by others; rather, they are executed in soliloquy. In contrast, saying something, asking a question, and issuing a command all assume an intended audience, without whom such a speech act is meaningless."

(p. 877)

1.3.9 Noda (2006)

Noda (2006) examines soliloquies in Japanese novels, a speech database, a play scenario, etc. Her work is another good illustration of the fact that Japanese people have intuitive understanding of what counts as soliloquy. For instance, (22) is an excerpt from a conversation; nevertheless, due to the use of the sentence-final particle nāa, Noda considers (22b) to be soliloquial.

(22) A: Ezara ga tsuita. Kore kurai no decorated-plate nom come-with this about gen ezara nāa nā de.

   decorated-plate cop
   'It comes with a decorated plate. About this size.'

B: laa boshii nāa.

   then I-want sp
   'Well then, I want it.'

On the other hand, in (23), the utterance with nāa appears to be soliloquial, but it conveys the speaker's complaint to the addressee.

(23) Ore wa kanojo no ni no ude o tsukamaeta.

   I top she gen upper-arm acc held
   'Itai nāa. kuma shinaide yo. Yooji nana?"

   painful spf bother-not spf matter spf
   'I held her upper arm. "It hurts. Don't bother me! What's the matter, eh?"'

Noda refers to those soliloquial utterances in awareness of the presence of an addressee as pseudo-soliloquy. By contrast, (24) is a genuine soliloquy which can occur in another person's presence; such utterances are not pseudo-soliloquy.

(24) [Having fallen down]

   U, iita!
   ei painful
   'Ouch! It hurts!'

Noda recognizes different degrees of falsity: those with weak pseudo-ness are, consequently, closer to genuine soliloquy. They convey that the utterance forthrightly reflects the speaker's honest thought, internal information processing, or feelings; they are used in order to create trustful rapport with the person in presence.


   eh husband top with went-not cop q ezara nāa nā de.

   decorated-plate cop
   'Eh, didn't your husband go with you?'
B: *Un, ikanakatta. Netetu kara ne.* Yeah went-not was-sleeping because spt

Well then, I want it.

A2: *A, sok-ka. sok-ka.* Oh I-see-q I-see-q

Oh, I see, I see.

The next type conveys stronger pseudo-ness, i.e. expressions of thoughts to be heard by the addressee. It includes indications of envy, admiration, complaint, and indirect request to the addressee. Frequently, such utterances are strategically made in order to avoid direct confrontation.

(26) A: *Un, ... 6-gatsu no owari de zenbu jugyou owari* yeah June gen end at all lecture end
desu-te shite aru kara.
cop-quot set because

"Yeah, it's because I told them that the lecture will be over at the end of June."

B: *Bi naa.*
good spt

'I envy you.'

Finally, the following exemplifies a stronger degree of pseudo-ness. This type of utterances normally conveys criticism and attempts to make the interlocutor aware of it.

(27) A: *Ore, raishuu kara 2-nenkan indo nanda kaeru* next-week from 2-years India cop return

made kangaete kurena kara.
until decide give-not q

I'll be sent to India next week for two years. Would you please decide on it by my return?'

B: *Mata konyaku no hanashi ne.* again engagement gen talk spt

You're talking about our engagement again?

A: *"Mata" wa hidoi naa. Shiken nanda zo.* again top terrible spt serious cop sfp

"Again" is a terrible thing to say. I'm serious, you know.

As seen in this section, soliloquy is an important mode of discourse for investigation of various linguistic aspects. It is, therefore, rather surprising that it has been treated only in passing and has never attracted great interest. This book is the first attempt to investigate the linguistic characteristics of soliloquy extensively and as its main concern.

1.4 The experiment

1.4.1 The data

This book examines the soliloquy data collected from 24 native speakers of Japanese and 10 native speakers of English. Each subject was asked to speak aloud his or her thoughts for 10–15 minutes while alone in an isolated room. They were instructed not to speak to an imaginary person or object, but, rather, to verbalize forthrightly whatever came into consciousness. Other than speaking as much as they were able, they were free to walk around, look at books and magazines, or whatever they preferred.

Their soliloquies were audio-recorded (not video-recorded) on a digital device and subsequently transcribed. The English data will be described in Chapter 6, wherein English soliloquy is analyzed. The Japanese data consist of 3,042 utterances, many of which were fragmented sentences. To determine where the boundaries between sentences and/or sentence fragments are located, a procedure was developed based on syntactic considerations, the duration of silence, and intonation contours. Hereafter, the term sentence will be used to refer to both sentences and to sentence fragments.

The 24 Japanese subjects consisted of 8 males and 16 females. The male subjects were in their 20's and 40's, and the female subjects' ages ranged between 20's and 50's. Sixteen subjects were native speakers of the Tokyo dialect; of the other dialect speakers, one speaker each was from Sapporo, Mie, Okayama, Kagawa, Fukuoka, and Nagasaki, and two were from Kyoto.

Some subjects were remarkably talkative; Subject E produced not only the highest number of sentences, but also very long ones. Subject R, on the other hand, uttered only 35 sentence units.

All subjects were aware that they were being recorded. This procedure might be criticized as removed from genuine, spontaneous soliloquy. Soliloquy can be defined in three ways: situationally, intentionally, or formally. Situationally, the term refers to any utterance when no person other than the speaker is present in the speech situation. If someone is alone, rehearsing his/her speech for a job interview, for example, it qualifies as soliloquy by this definition. In this sense, my data clearly consist of authentic soliloquies because no one else was present in the experiment room.
Table 3. Japanese subjects (UT = total number of utterances)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subj</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Dialect</th>
<th>UT</th>
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<tr>
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<td>M</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>Sapporo</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>G</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>405</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>205</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>505</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soliloquy can also be defined intentionally, i.e. those utterances that are not meant to be addressed to any other individual. This notion of soliloquy is what I am interested in, and, although never discussed explicitly, I believe that the researchers introduced in Section 1.3 likewise are. The problem with this definition is that soliloquy cannot then be objectively identified; only the speaker can tell whether his/her utterance is not intended for another person. It is important to note that this problem is deemed to exist even when dealing with naturalistic, spontaneous soliloquies. Therefore, if one subscribes to this notion of soliloquy, collection of data in an experimental setting is no less qualified as genuine soliloquy than are spontaneous soliloquies.

The third way to define soliloquy is based on the utterance form. Most researchers in Section 1.3 utilize their intuitive inference regarding the speaker’s intention as well as utterance forms, e.g. the presence of certain sentence-final particles and whether or not an utterance can occur in the quoted clause of verbs of thinking. This definition is possible because, as mentioned in Section 1.1, Japanese has grammaticized the soliloquy mode of discourse. However, the decision on which form should be qualified as soliloquy does not appear to be clear cut.

As mentioned earlier, it is widely agreed upon that Japanese has various interactional, addressee-oriented expressions, e.g. (a) certain sentence-final particles (e.g. ze ‘I tell you’), (b) directives (e.g. commands, requests, questions), (c) vocative expressions (e.g. hora ‘Look!’ or ‘Hey’), (d) responses (e.g. hai ‘yes’, iie ‘no’), (e) pragmatic adverbials of various sorts (e.g. ni kiku dakedo ‘it’s hard to say, but’ gozonnunoo yomu ‘as you know’), (f) hearsay expressions (e.g. (da)soodaifidaete ‘I hear’), and (g) addressee honorifics (e.g. desu/masu).

When an interactional, addressee-oriented expression is present, native speakers of Japanese normally perceive the utterance to be addressed to some other person. On the other hand, when such expressions are absent, we need to consider all of the situational, intentional, and formal definitions in order to determine whether an utterance in question is soliloquial. We are indeed in murky waters when attempting to determine authentic soliloquy in both naturalistic and experimental utterances.

Regarding the experimental method of data collection, Subject R said:

(28) A, demo, kono jikken-ji tai o kangaete miru to, oh but this experiment itself refl try-to-think if re-su yone. Hikensha ni ito o tsuetae iru that-oop sfp subject to purpose refl has-conveyed kara. shizendenai-tte ku ka. Doo nan doro. Kooyuu because unnatural-or-something L-wonder this-kind jikken yaru baai ni wa, aete, ito o experiment do in-case dare purpose refl tsuetai: katteri shibaraa ka, katteri not-conveying freely let-talk or without-notice rekoodo: sara ka. Ma, koosatsu mitainai kanji ga record or well something-like-observation nom aru teedo. ichiban ii mitai na. Yappari, kooyuu faumi somewhat best like anyway this-way mokuteki o tsuetae iru aru teedo, sore o purpose refl if-conveying somewhat that refl isshikishiteru-tte no ga aru kara. Uso, demo. being-conscious nom exist because uh but doo nan doro. Ma, kooyuu jikken toku L-wonder well this-kind experiment alike sara to naru to. Maitta, maitta. Te ka, hikooki no if-do I’m-lost or airplane gen oto ga urusee. sound nom noisy

Yeah, but if we think about this experiment itself, it’s problematic, isn’t it? Because the subjects know the purpose, it’s kind of unnatural. I don’t know. When we do this kind of experiment, we shouldn’t tell what the purpose
is, and just let them talk, or record it without letting them know. Well, just observing or something like that might be the best way. Anyway, if I know the purpose, I'll become conscious about it. Well, but I don't know. If we have this kind of experiment, I'm lost. Oh that airplane is too noisy!'

The are-ssu yone in the first sentence in (28) – a colloquial variation of are desu yone (‘Lit. isn't it that?’ with an addressee honorific – indicates that the subject is talking to an imaginary addressee, likely to be me in the role of the experimenter. However, the other utterances in (28) are genuine soliloquy, formally as well as in terms of the subject's intention, which is derived from my interpretation of the discourse. The subject's move to the unconnected final two sentences is highly unlikely to occur in a conversation.

Exposing the purpose of the experiment that this subject worries about is ideological rather than substantial. What the subjects were told was merely that I, the experimenter, was interested in how people soliloquize, not much more than saying that I wanted to record their soliloquies. Recording utterances without subjects' consent for research is prohibited in the United States and many other nations.

It cannot be denied that the subjects' awareness of being recorded somewhat influenced the content of their soliloquies. One subject said:

(29) A nanka kono hitorigoto monka-ppokatte nanka
    oh somehow this soliloquy complaint-like somehow
    dipuresu no ko mitai dakara, motto ukaru
    depressed gen child like because more cheerful
    koto shaberoo.
    thing talk (presumptive)
    ‘Oh, my talk sounds too negative, like a depressed person. I should talk about something more cheerful.'

She might or might not make this kind of reflective commentary in spontaneous soliloquy.

Surprisingly, most subjects spoke liberally, including personal problems. Generally speaking, younger subjects were less inhibited than older subjects. I usually used my office for these recording sessions, and some subjects disliked my possessions. One looked around the room and found haiku books; she said (30a): another subject talked about the scroll hanging from a wall and said (30b); the third subject commented on my Dell laptop (30c):

    gee and-alike that-kind thing dislike
    ‘Gee, haiku books. I hate them!'
1.4.2 Soliloquy types

Applying Berk and Garvin's (1984) categorization, introduced in Section 1.2.2 above, to the collected data, the following types of soliloquy can be found:

(32) Affect expression
   a. Ma, naka-naka kooyatte tachidomatte, nanka.
      well nearly this-way stop-and something
      shizukan shiteru tokit-te nai kamo. Uan, ii nee.
      quietly doing time not-exist maybe yeah good sfp
      'Well, it's rare to be quiet and stay still like this. Yeah, it's good!'
   b. Eeto, a sugee. Hon ga ippai ddu.
      well wow book nom many cop
      'Well, wow. A lot of books!'
   c. Yappa, demo, DVD o doonika surutte yorimo,
      as-expected but acc do-something rather
      sono mae no dankai de mono ga
      that before gen step loc things nom
      oosurimu da yone. Soo, soo, soo.
      too-many cop sfp right
      'Well, but moving the DVD disks isn't the big problem. Above all, I have too many things. Right, right, right.'

(33) Describing one's own activity and self guidance
   a. Kyoo wa suuada ni ikanakute ii. A,
      today top supermarket to not-go ok oh
      suuada ni ikanakute ii kedo, daakara, DVD o kaeshi
      but so acc return
      ni ikanakya ikenai.
      for must-go
      'I don't have to go to the supermarket today. I don't have to go there, but I have to return the DVD.'
   b. A. hiikoki no chikett torana na. Hayaku
      oh airplane gen ticket must-get sfp quickly
      toran to dorion takaku naru kamo shirehen.
      not-get if rapidly high become might-be
      'Oh, I need to buy an airplane ticket. If I don't buy it soon, the price might go way up.'
   c. A, Hirano Keiichiro. A kono hito, Akutagawa-shoo
      this person Akutagawa-Award

(34) Self-answered questions
   a. [Looking at a magazine]
      this where I-wonder Kanagawa-prefecture humm
      'Where is it? Hase temple. In Kanagawa, ok.'
   b. Kyoo uchi ni kaettara, nani shiyoo kanaa.
      today home to when-return what do sfp
      Tenki ga ii kara, osoto nimo ikitai shi.
      weather nom good because outside also want-to-go
      Demo, nanji ni kaeru ka wakannai niaa.
      but what-time at return q not-know sfp
      'What shall I do today after I go home? It's a fine day, so I want to go out. But I don't know what time I'll get home.'
   c. Y wa doo shiteru kane, Doo shiteru kanaa. Uan.
      top how doing sfp sfp humm
      saigo ni hanashi kiita toki ni, nanka,
      last story heard when single-mother
      ni natta toka itteta kedo, are kara doo
      to became or-something said but that since now
      natta no kanaa, uan. Dare ni kiitaru, Y no koto ga
      became sfp humm who to if-ask about nom
      wakaru kane. X-chan kanaa. H-chan kanaa. A, S-chan
      know sfp sfp
      'I wonder how Y's doing. How is she doing? Well, the last time I talked with her, she said she'd become a single mother. How has she been since then? How can I find out about her? Ask X? Ask H? Oh, maybe S. I think if I ask S, I can find out about her.'
Some questions are raised but not answered:

a. **Nande hitorigoton toki wa kansaihen narun**
   why self-talk when top Kansai-dialect become
   yaro. **Nande kana. Nanka, hokano hito to**  
   1-wonder why sfp somehow other person with
   shaberu toki waHyoojungo de shaberu
   talk when top standard-language in talk
   shi, demo, hitorigoto yattara...
   and but self-talk if it is
   'Why do I talk in the Kansai dialect? Why? When I talk with other people,
   I use the standard dialect, but when I talk to myself...'

b. [Looking at the scroll hanging on a wall]
   **Kono kakejiku wa dare ga kaitan kanaa. joozu**
   this scroll top who nom wrote sfp good
   ya naa.
   cop sfp
   'Who wrote this scroll? It's good.'

c. **Ichiban ii no wa, 1-nen han de sotagyoo deki**
   best one top 1-year half by graduate can
   nagara, intaan dekuiri koto dakedo, sore wa
   and intern can situation but that top
   kakujitsu ni muri de ate. Dotchi ga in
   certainly impossible and either-one nom good
   daroo. Intaan daroo ka. 1-nen han daroo ka.
   1-wonder intern 1-wonder 1-year half 1-wonder
   'The best thing is to graduate in one and a half years and work as an intern,
   but that's certainly impossible. Which is better? Intern? Graduating in
   one and a half years?'

(36) Reading aloud

a. [Reading a magazine]
   "**Kurosawa Akira no 1-nichi 4-shoku shugi** hee.
   gen 1-day 4-meals principle wow
   1-nichi 4-shoku shugi dattan d(aa.
   cop-past
   "Akira Kurosawa's 4 meals a day life," wow. He ate 4 times a day!"

b. [Looking at a bottle on the desk]
   **Nan da, kono nomimono " Daitetto" Kore, daitetto**
   what cop this drink diet this diet
1.5 Summary

This chapter has introduced several concepts developed in the study of soliloquy in the field of psychology, viz. egocentric speech, private speech, crib speech, and self-talk. These all refer to those utterances that can be categorized as soliloquy, but have different historical significance as well as different focuses.

The term egocentric speech, coined by Piaget (1923/2002), usually refers to children’s failed communication due to the lack of necessary consideration of the addressee’s background knowledge and perspective. Children, however, do not mind whether or not their speech is understood by the hearer; it is a kind of autistic activity. Piaget concluded that their egocentric speech subsequently disappears as a result of children’s cognitive maturity and socialization.

Vygotsky (1934/1986) interpreted children’s seemingly non-communicative speech as a transition from social speech to mature inner speech. That is, contrary to Piaget, the developmental direction is not from egocentric speech to social speech, but, rather, from social speech to inner (egocentric) speech. Children think aloud because they have not yet developed the practice of thinking internally. Eventually, the child learns to separate speech for oneself and speech for others. Soliloquy from Vygotsky’s perspective is commonly referred to as private speech. The main function of such private speech is considered to be self-direction and self-regulation. Vygotsky speculated that as private speech develops into internal thought, it becomes more abbreviated and cryptic. This thesis has not been verified empirically.

Vygotsky hypothesized that private speech disappears when school age is reached and children’s inner speech stabilizes. However, it is generally agreed upon today that although private speech gradually becomes less noticeable as children age, it is not because they abandon it. Rather, children learn that thinking aloud is stigmatized in our society and relinquish private speech when they are not alone.

The term crib speech refers to early childhood utterances to the self when left alone in the dark before falling asleep. (It is not talking in one’s sleep.) Crib speech has more limited vocabulary than day-time speech and often sounds like rigorous grammatical exercises. A term not limited to children is self-talk, referring to the use of soliloquy to control one’s behavior in such areas as cognitive behavior therapy, sport training, and teacher education. Another area in which soliloquy is widely investigated is adult 1.2 acquisition, where the term private speech is commonly used, rather than self-talk. Learners of intermediate proficiency use private speech in a manner similar to children’s private speech, but advanced learners’ private speech resembles that of adult native speakers.


Finally, the experimentally-obtained data to be examined in this chapter have been described in this chapter. The Japanese data consist of soliloquies of 24 subjects, 8 males and 16 females, all native speakers of Japanese, who spoke aloud their individual thoughts in isolation for 10–15 minutes. Their soliloquies were recorded and subsequently transcribed, producing 3,042 utterances. Although all subjects were aware that they were being recorded, the data are genuine because the purpose of the present study is to eliminate from the discourse an addressee who is distinct from the speaker him/herself. The subjects’ awareness of being recorded is unlikely to impact significantly in this regard. (An examination of English soliloquy is also contained in Chapter 6.)

Analyzing soliloquy is intellectually inspirational as well as instrumental in advancing our knowledge of language in general. As Vygotsky argues, language may be fundamentally social in its origin; however, for adult speakers, language’s faculty for advancing thinking is at least equally, perhaps more, significant than its faculty for communication. Soliloquy must be recognized as an essential use of language to which attention should be paid.

In this book, we shall examine the soliloquy data with respect to the issues for which the presence or absence of an address plays a particularly significant role: deixis and anaphora (Chapter 2), the sentence-final particles na and yo (Chapter 3), gendered speech (Chapter 4), linguistic politeness (Chapter 5), and the use of the second person pronoun you in soliloquy in English (Chapter 6).