

Soliloquy in Japanese and English

CHAPTER 6

The indefinite *you* in English soliloquy

6.1 Introduction

As noted in Chapter 1, one of the main objectives of this book is advocacy for the use of soliloquy data in linguistic investigation. Elimination of addressees can shed different light on language use in general and possibly even on concealed aspects of language in interpersonal communication.

A number of interesting discoveries have been reported and discussed in Chapters 2–5, which were devoted to topics in Japanese linguistics. The present chapter examines some experimentally-obtained data of English-language soliloquy, with the second person pronoun *you* as the topic of interest. Commonsensically, the most salient usage of first and second person pronouns is deictic/indexical: i.e. *I* refers to the speaker, and *you*, to the addressee(s). Soliloquy involves no addressee, making the use of *you* in it of particular interest. Does *you* occur rarely? Or, does it refer to the speaker's other self (alter ego) in a pseudo-conversation? The second question is of theoretical significance with respect to inquiry into thought as dialogue.

Although the deictic function of first and second person pronouns is most significant, exceptions to this standard paradigm are actually quite commonplace:

- (1) a. [Inclusive authorial *we*]
We now turn to a different problem. (Quirk et al. 1985: 350)
- b. [A doctor is talking to a patient (*we* = addressee)]
How are we feeling today? (ibid.)
- c. *Just think! In the twenty-third century we'll teleport to Mars in just seconds.*
(Whitley 1978: 18)
- d. *When my great-grandad was a boy, you could still buy candy for a penny a stick.* (ibid.)

The entities indexed by *we* in (1c) and *you* in (1d) are nonspecific – pointing to people in general. These cases are referred to as *indefinite* (also as *generic*, *impersonal*, or *non-deictic*) uses of personal pronouns.¹ Hyman (2004: 164) even goes

1. Third person pronouns can also be used indefinitely, but they are not discussed in this chapter. In English, the category of primarily indefinite personal pronouns (or impersonal pronouns) consists of *one*, *anyone*, *someone*, and *everyone*. Whitley (1978: 20) reports that, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, literary attestation of indefinite *we* dates from 893, whereas that of indefinite *you* from 1577.

on to claim that in today's English, contrary to common belief, indefinite *you* is probably more common than deictic *you*. Because most of the occurrences of *you* in our soliloquy data are indefinite, relevant literature will first be reviewed in Section 6.2. The soliloquy research data will then be scrutinized in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4. Section 6.5 discusses implications of the findings, and Section 6.6 provides a summary of the chapter.

6.2 Major characteristics of indefinite *you*

6.2.1 Whitley (1978)

Whitley's (1978) work is, to my knowledge, the first extensive study of indefinite (he uses the term *impersonal*) pronouns in English. He argues that they tend to appear in the following five sentence types: *viewpoint*, *obligation*, *possibility*, *procedure*, and *narration* (pp. 21–24).

- (2) a. [Viewpoint]
Reagan either turns us/you on or turns us/you off.
Just when we/you survive one tragedy, another pops up.
- b. [Obligation]
He'll find out soon enough that we/you just don't oppose the chairman.
It's time we/you stopped and asked ourselves/yourself which projects are worthwhile.
- c. [Possibility]
We/You can't do that in Botswana or Swaziland.
We/You can't get ahead in this country the way we/you used to.
- d. [Procedure]
To make kumquat cookies, we/you strain our/your pulp and fold in Mother Nadine's Cookie Mix.
Now we/you insert tab A into slot B, taking care not to tear notch C.
- e. [Narration]
You/They get a lot of snow in the Faeroe Islands.
In medieval France you/they had to go through several ranks to become a knight.

In viewpoint sentences, e.g. (2a), some attitude or opinion, typically the speaker's own, is projected to people in general. In obligation sentences, e.g. (2b), paraphrasing with impersonal constructions is possible, e.g. *It is necessary (obligatory, imperative) that ...* In these two sentence types, impersonal *we* and *you* are virtually synonymous and interchangeable. Possibility sentences, e.g. (2c), characteristically

involve the modal *can*. Procedure sentences, e.g. (2d), state directions, recipes, and instructions.

Impersonal *we* and *you* differ slightly in the possibility and procedure sentence types: *we* commits the speaker as part of the referenced group, but *you* commits no one, not even the addressee. Therefore, when *we* is used in *We/You can't do that in Botswana or Swaziland*, the speaker has come from or plans to go to Botswana or Swaziland, but with *you*, no such direct experience with these countries is implied. Similarly, the speaker's involvement is implied in procedure sentences with *we*, but not necessarily with *you*.

Narrative sentences, e.g. (2e), express recalled situations and reports of characteristic behavior. Here, impersonal *you* and *they* can be used to represent broad, unspecified groups of people. Impersonal *we* can also occur in narrative sentences, but only if the speaker considers him/herself belonging to the referent group, e.g. the speaker is Faeroese in (2e).

Whitley (1978:24–27) goes on to posit seven constraints on the use of impersonal pronouns:

- I. Impersonal pronouns cannot be stressed. When [ja] is used in *You can't control a kid like Thibault*, *you* can be represented as either impersonal or personal, but with [júw], only the personal interpretation is possible. Similarly, *you* is ambiguous in *That professor always ignored you*, but not in the marked construction counterpart, *The one that professor always ignored was you*.
- II. Impersonal *you* and *they* cannot be followed by a relative clause (restrictive or nonrestrictive) or by an appositive, and no impersonal forms can be conjoined, either with each other or with other NPs. For example, only the personal interpretation is possible in *You who do that kind of thing should know better*, and *John and you never used to backtalk when Mary was young*.
- III. Unlike other pronouns, impersonal *they* ordinarily resists conversion into oblique forms (*them*, *their*). That is, it functions only as a subject, e.g. only personal interpretation is possible in *Back then it was called "the vapors" by them* and *The mailman won't hand them their letters in person anymore*.
- IV. Impersonal *you* and *we* differ in that *we* (but not *you*) commits at least the speaker to the referential grouping. Consequently, the two pronouns cannot be used interchangeably in all sentence types listed above.
- V. Personal pronouns must bear the feature [+definite] because they can follow partitives (e.g. *some of*, *all of*) and *as for*. Of the three impersonal pronouns, only *we* can occur in such contexts without repersonalization (i.e. becoming definite): *Bertha's vanity strikes some of us/#you as thoroughly unfounded*.

- VI. Any entities behind impersonal *you* seem incapable of participating in specific, one-time actions and events. This is unlike personal *you*. Impersonal *you* co-occurs with generic (imperfective) VPs, but tends not to co-occur with perfective VPs. If used with a perfective VP, *you* repersonalizes, while *we* and *they* have no such limitation: *I don't think we'll/they'll/#you'll finish that budget on time.*
- VII. Impersonal *they* enters hesitantly, if at all, into combination with the categories of viewpoint and obligation (*We/You/#They gotta go on faith*), but readily combines with possibility and narration (*We/You/They can take Salem out of the country, but ...*).

6.2.2 Bolinger (1979)

Bolinger (1979) vigorously criticizes Whitley (1978), insisting that all but (IV) and (VI) are mere tendencies, not constraints. He provides counter-examples for each of Whitley's alleged constraints; some of his counter-examples are provided below:

- I. This constraint states that impersonal pronouns cannot be highlighted (a) intonationally and (b) syntactically. Bolinger refutes both:
You can't expect sympathy if yóu do it, only if somebody else does it.
When somebody else gets caught it's OK, but if its yóu that gets caught, there's something wrong with the law! (cleft construction)
I've felt the same way sometimes. It's all right for the professor to ignore the nobodies, but when the one he ignores is yóu, that means he's unfair. (pseudo-cleft construction)
- II. Impersonal pronouns cannot be accompanied by relative clauses, or be coordinated. Counter-examples:
Having grass on you in Mexico is risky. They let a dozen slip by, but then yóu, who are always the one they pick on, get two years in a filthy jail. (nonrestrictive relative clause)
They who say that are liars. (restrictive relative clause)
You never get caught in these things alone – it's always you and your mother and your aunt. (conjoining impersonal forms)
- III. Impersonal pronouns resist oblique forms. Counter-examples:
My rule is, when I feel I've been given a bad egg I let them know about it.
I hate to travel – everywhere you go they cheat you, and I'd rather stay home and be cheated by my local shopkeepers than cheated by thém.

- IV. Bolinger acknowledges that this constraint is valid but, nevertheless, uninteresting because it states only that the impersonal pronouns are not identical in meaning.
- V. Impersonal pronouns cannot appear in partitives or *as for*. Counter-examples:
Well, in the Army you always know that some of you are going to have to die, and all of you are going to hate the place before it's over. Civilians can turn down an order, but as for you, well, it's your neck if you refuse.
- VII. Bolinger identifies the cause of the unacceptability of Whitley's examples under this constraint to be due to an attempt to generalize to everyone something that can be true only in limited situations.
 When the scope of the statement is narrowed by the use of an adverb, viewpoint and obligation are easily expressed with impersonal pronouns: *#They gotta go on faith* can be mended as *In the Civil Service they don't have the evaluation procedure to promote you on merit. They gotta go on faith.*

Bolinger acknowledges that Whitley's constraint (VI) is an original, generally valid contribution. However, he insists, reworking of the constraint is necessary. For example, he questions Whitley's degree of generality in claiming that *you* is as generic as *anyone* and *everyone*. Considering (3) below, Bolinger recognizes that although it is in the past tense, what *you* refers to is not someone who lived in the past, but an observer or commentator in the present.

- (3) *Back in the pre-Cambrian you/*they/*one couldn't see the sun because of all the steam.*

You, an observer now, can shift *your* perspective back, but in the pre-Cambrian age there was no actual observer that could be referenced by *they* or *one*. This sense of here-and-nowness is implied by *you*, but not by *they* or *one*. Bolinger considers this characteristic to parallel with the following example of Whitley's:

- (4) *You/they get a lot of snow in the Faeroe Islands.*

The referent of *they* is people in the Faeroe Islands or the islands themselves, whereas that of *you* is a mere observer who might never have been to the islands.

Bolinger hypothesizes that the function of indefinite *you* is to express something *normative*. Therefore, a directive with *you* sounds odd if the speaker does not believe that it is a right thing to do, as exemplified in (5):

- (5) *How can you tell a horse's age? – They/?You look at his teeth, but I really have no faith in it.*

Another context that involves a norm is a paratactic conditional sequence of sentences, in which the protasis is expressed without *if*. Such expressions must refer to normal consequences and sound better with *you* than with other pronouns:

- (6) a. *You try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits you.*
- b. *?We try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits us.*
- c. *??They try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits them.*
- d. **One tries to tell him something, he hauls off and hits one.*

Bolinger also scrutinizes Whitley's (1978:26) claim:

"Sentences in which the impersonal interpretation of *you* is possible ... tend to translate with imperfective aspect, which depicts the action as habitual, recurrent, ongoing, or repetitive."

He argues that the cause of incompatibility between impersonal *you* and perfective aspect is the fact that a transitory event does not express a norm. That is, habitual, recurrent, or repetitive events are all consonant with what is typical and normal, but merely ongoing events, which are expressed with imperfective aspect, are unrelated to the notion of norm and, thus, contrary to Whitley, incompatible with impersonal *you*.

- (7) **Nowadays you are catching hell if you don't have a license.*

Finally, Bolinger decisively rejects Whitley's analysis of the personal and impersonal *you*'s as homonyms, declaring that the deeper he goes into impersonal *you*, the more personal it feels. Although not to the extent of *we*, impersonal *you* nevertheless adopts the speaker's viewpoint regarding norms. According to Bolinger, the impersonal *you* is a *courtesy device*, inviting the addressee to share a viewpoint with the speaker. By saying *You do it like this*, the speaker gives instructions without insisting on his/her role as instructor, which would be the case with *I do it like this*.²

Because there is no semantic discontinuity between personal *you* and impersonal *you*, Bolinger draws attention to numerous contexts where *you* is ambiguous between the two interpretations. Consider *want to* as a sometimes cautionary, gentler, subtler courtesy device to substitute for the modal of obligation *should*, e.g. (8a). This use of *want to* is personal, as demonstrated by the oddness of its

2. Some native speakers of American English object to this contention. They say *I do it like this* feels much less imposing than *You do it like this*. The former provides the addressee with the information deemed valuable for successful completion of the task, but it does not come across as if the speaker knows the "one and only" best way. As pointed out later in this chapter, there is no semantic discontinuity between the personal *you* and the impersonal *you*, so *You do it like this* takes on an imperative interpretation as well, but *I do it like this* avoids it.

co-occurrence with impersonal *one*, e.g. (8b). Nevertheless, *want to* is compatible with impersonal *you*, e.g. (8c).

- (8) a. *You don't want to hurt his feelings.*
- b. *??One doesn't want to hurt his feelings.*
- c. *How do you put the point across? – Well, you start in slow and easy, because you don't want to assume that everybody is sympathetic or even listening.*

Although not invalidating Bolinger's analysis, the fact that *you* can occur routinely in soliloquy, as will be observed shortly, indicates that courtesy for the addressee is not the sole motivation for the use of the impersonal *you*.

6.2.3 Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990)

Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) make a three-way distinction in personal pronoun usage: *referential*, *impersonal*, and *vague*. Referential uses identify specific individuals. Impersonal uses apply to anyone and/or everyone. Vague uses apply to specific, but not identified, individuals. Kitagawa and Lehrer characterize the impersonal use as shown in (9); (9a, b) are adapted from Laberge and Sankoff (1979):

- (9) a. It conveys the theme of generality – particularly a generally-acknowledged truth or a personal opinion that the speaker hopes is shared.
- b. It can be replaced by an indefinite pronoun, e.g. *one*.
- c. Impersonal use of a personal pronoun cannot exclude in its reference what its normal (deictic) use would signify (e.g. the addressee cannot be excluded from the reference of the impersonal *you* by such phrases as *I don't mean you personally*).³
- d. The meaning of sentences with impersonal use of personal pronouns approximates that of sentences with universally quantified NPs or variables bound by them. For example, in "But I have a gift for teaching ... Plus, teaching fiction writing is a lot like writing. You have to examine manuscripts, use your mind, come up with possibilities, respond to characters in situations," *you* does not refer to everybody, but only to those who teach fiction writing.
- e. A personal pronoun used impersonally resists pronoun shift in indirect quotation.

3. Russell Lee-Goldman has provided a counter-example through a google search: "Forget about catching, you can hardly kill a wild cow even with a machine gun. I am serious, I don't mean you personally but even people living [in] the jungle can suffer a lot." This is a reply to the question "could a person kill a cow with just a spear?" It seems that the *you* refers to "people in general," but not vague in the sense used by Kitagawa and Lehrer.

- f. The number feature of impersonal *you* is singular.

The vague *you* is characterized by comparison with the impersonal *you*. Regarding (9c), the following examples are provided for comparison:

- (10) a. *You have to examine manuscripts, use your mind.* (impersonal)
 b. **You have to examine manuscripts – I don't mean you personally – use your mind.* (impersonal)
 c. *You're – I don't mean you personally – you're going to destroy us all in a nuclear war.* (vague)

Regarding the pronoun shift, (11) and (12) are contrasted. In (11b), the impersonal *you* does not change in the indirect quotation, but the vague *you* must be adjusted, as shown in (12), wherein (10c) is indirectly quoted.

- (11) a. *You can build your own TV set if you buy a kit.* (impersonal)
 b. *John said that you can build your own TV set if you buy a kit.* (impersonal)
 (12) a. *The European woman said to me that we – not me personally, of course – are going to destroy them in a nuclear war.* (vague)
 b. *The European woman said to her that they – not her personally – were going to destroy us in a nuclear war.* (vague)

As for the number feature, (9f), the impersonal *you* in (13a) is singular, but the vague *you* in (13b) must be plural:

- (13) a. *Two hundred years ago, you used to go into the forest when you wanted firewood for yourself/*yourselves.* (impersonal)
 b. *You're – I don't mean you personally – you're going to destroy yourselves/*yourself in a huge nuclear disaster.* (vague)

Adopting Laberge and Sankoff (1979) and Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982), Kitagawa and Lehrer divide the usage of the impersonal *you* into three subtypes:⁴

- (14) a. The Situational Insertion type (occurring in structural knowledge description), e.g. *Yesterday, we went to Sabino Canyon. And I was talking with this guy who happened to drop in on us. And all of a sudden he began*

4. Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982) claim that people can describe the world by describing what things happen in it or by describing how the world is structured so that such things may happen in it. The former is said to express *phenomenal* knowledge encoded with the use of present progressive, whereas the latter is said to express structural knowledge encoded with the simple present tense.

to get agitated, and he swung at me. You react instinctively at a time like that. I hit him back.

- b. The Moral or Truism Formulation type (occurring in structural knowledge description), e.g. *You kill yourself to raise your kids properly, and guess what happens.*
 c. The Life Drama type (not limited to structural knowledge description), e.g. *You're going down the highway, you're having a wonderful time, singing a song, and suddenly – You get into an argument.*

The Situational Insertion *you* can be replaced by *one*, *everyone*, or *anyone*:

- (15) a. *You react instinctively at a time like that.*
 b. *One/Everyone/Anyone reacts instinctively at a time like that.*

In the Moral or Truism Formulation subtype, *you* may be replaced by *one*, but not by *everyone* or *anyone*:

- (16) a. *You kill yourself to raise your kids properly, and guess what happens.*
 b. *One kills oneself to raise one's kids properly, and guess what happens.*
 c. *?Everyone/*Anyone kills himself to raise his kids properly, and guess what happens.*

In the Life Drama variety, *you* cannot be replaced by *one* or *everyone* without affecting the acceptability, or altering the intended effect, of the discourse:

- (17) a. *You are in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that you have really left your own world and time behind when suddenly you meet your next-door neighbor from home.*
 b. *?One is in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that he has really left his own world and time behind when suddenly he meets his next-door neighbor from home.*
 c. *?*Everyone/*Anyone is in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that they have really left their world and time behind when suddenly they meet their next-door neighbor from home.*

In the Life Drama, the progressive form is limited to the scene setting portion only, and the present tense is used for the resolution of the story. In (14c), for example, if *You get into an argument* is substituted with *You're getting into an argument*, it will be understood as a continuation of the scene setting, and the hearer will continue to expect the resolution.

The Life Drama *you* behaves somewhat differently from the other two in indirect quotation:

- (18) a. *Rodenmyer says that you react instinctively at a time like that.* (Situational Insertion)
 b. *Rodenmyer says that you kill yourself to raise your kids properly, and guess what happens.* (Moral or Truism Formulation)
 c. *?Rodenmyer says that you are in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that you have really left your own world and time behind when suddenly you meet your next-door neighbor from home.* (Life Drama)

Kitagawa and Lehrer contend that the generality expressed by impersonal *you* varies from straightforward generic statements and event-oriented structural knowledge descriptions to life drama narratives. Like Bolinger's characterization of courtesy, they recognize that the use of impersonal *you* is often accompanied by a sense of camaraderie because the speaker assigns a major actor role to the addressee and allows him/her into the speaker's world view, assuming that the addressee shares the same perspective – which creates a sense of camaraderie.

Finally, Kitagawa and Lehrer propose a typology of languages that permit impersonal uses of personal pronouns and those that do not. The former have a closed pronominal system (e.g. Chinese, English, French, German, Modern Hebrew), whereas the latter do not (e.g. Japanese and Korean). In languages like Japanese and Korean, the so-called personal pronouns are closely tied to the actual speech act context, reflecting semantic and pragmatic properties relative to social and psychological factors. Such pronouns are, therefore, too complex and loaded with information to be generalized and used impersonally.

6.2.4 Wales (1996)

Wales (1996) provides an interesting example in which *you* shifts smoothly from indefinite to deictic:

- (19) *Litter slows you down. Take your litter home with you.*

The first occurrence of *you* is generic, so that it can be substituted with *us*, but the subsequent *your* and *you* cannot be substituted with *ours* and *us*. She recognizes that the traditional distinctions among first, second, and third person pronouns have become blurred over the years; they can all be used as impersonal/indefinite. Nevertheless, she argues, impersonal uses are polysemous, not completely devoid of their canonical, indexical notions (p. 8). Furthermore, such pronouns are potentially ambiguous regarding their generality. For instance, in instruction manuals, *you* usually refers both to the reader and to anyone in that situation.

- (20) *With a symmetrical spinnaker when you gybe all you have to do is move the sail across ...*

Two factors sometimes motivate people to use *you* to refer to themselves; they may wish to avoid too-frequent use of *I* and/or sounding egocentric.

- (21) a. *It only seems to work and be happy when you manage or have been in phases where you delay some of the other problems like when your brother is away in America.*
 b. *It always rather shook me when I first got married in London you'd be carrying away practically buckets of that every day ...*

Contrary to the popular belief that *you* is the informal equivalent of *one*, these two pronouns can occur in a single sentence. Her examples include:

- (22) a. *I don't feel that one can ever be a therapist to somebody that you are so closely involved with emotionally.*
 b. *One can't go into any real scholarly work – having penetrated so far your penetration is forced to stop.*

6.2.5 Hyman (2004)

Hyman (2004) points out that *you's* numberless and gender-free applicability aids its indefinite use more extensively than other pronouns. He proposes a continuum of overlapping categories of *you*: *deictic*, *indefinite*, *anaphoric*, and *existential expletive*. By *indefinite*, he means,

“*you* is often of indefinite grammatical person, sometimes denoting the speaker, sometimes denoting generically or indefinitely nearly everybody or anybody, and sometimes even denoting the person(s) addressed, and very often denoting some overlap of two or more grammatical persons.” (p. 165)

- (23) a. [Indefinite]
In one week and two days, I will be finished with nine months of treatment for cancer. First they poison you; then they burn you.
 b. [Anaphoric]
Outside Longmont, 35 miles north of [Denver], Jack Osborne, 69, stood in his kitchen – lined with wallpaper and knickknacks depicting his favorite fowl – raised his hands and cut a 6-by-8-inch cube into the air. “It's inhumane to put a chicken in a cage this small,” he said with a grimace. “You can't even lift your wings.”
 c. [Anaphoric]
I wrestled with the fact every day that if the defendants were found guilty I would have to decide if they would live or die. No one in this world can understand how that feels until they are placed in that position. Being in

the courthouse every day, you learn things about others. One of the things I learned about [the defendant] was that she had not repented to God or expressed any remorse for her actions since she had been arrested.

- d. [Anaphoric]
"We were on welfare," recalled [Sarah Jessica] Parker. ... "I knew I was different from the kids who pay for lunch or bring their lunch from home. It was a stigma thing. I was not the only person receiving a free lunch, but you are aware."
- e. [Existential expletives]
But the 1950s are very interesting because you had the Korean War, you had Joe McCarthy, and you had the rise of John F. Kennedy.
- f. [Existential expletives]
You can't find a house for less than \$250,000 in our town.

Hyman reports that the antecedent of anaphoric *you* is frequently *I* or *me*, as shown in (23c, d), although *you* is normally not exactly co-referential (semi-co-referential) with its antecedent. Like Wales (1996), he analyzes this shift from the first person to the second to be a politeness maneuver, to reduce appearing egocentric, as well as a maneuver to generalize beyond the single individual (p. 169).

For Hyman, some instances of *you have* (or *you* + modal) no longer refer to persons, whether definable or indefinable. Example (23e) is equivalent to *There was the Korean War, there was Joe McCarthy, and there was the rise of John F. Kennedy*. Similarly, (23f) is equivalent to *There are no houses available for less than \$250,000 in our town*.

Hyman understands the meanings, references, or interpretations of *you* as unstable and dynamic, even changing within a single utterance. He goes so far as to suggest the hypothesis that the indefinite *you* is the general case, and the deictic *you* is derived from the indefinite *you*. True, he continues, the vagueness of *you* risks miscommunication. However, it can enable rhetorical effectiveness, i.e. generalization of the statement. The flexibility and wider scope of indefinite *you* can compensate for its vagueness.

6.3 The data

Equipped with the background information provided in Section 6.2, we can now examine the experimental soliloquy data. Ten native speakers of American English (five males and five females in their 20's, 30's, and 60's) were recruited as subjects. As with the case of the Japanese soliloquy data collection, each subject

spoke aloud his or her thoughts for approximately 15 minutes while alone in an isolated room. They were asked not to speak to an imaginary person, but, rather, to verbalize spontaneously and forthrightly whatever came into consciousness. Their soliloquies were recorded and subsequently transcribed; data consisting of a total of 18,609 words were obtained. Several subjects commented on the artificial nature of this setup, but they eventually lost their self-consciousness and became accustomed to this mode of monologic expression.

As predicted (Chapter 1, Section 1.1), compared and contrasting with Japanese, soliloquies in English resemble ordinary conversation to a great extent. Therefore, if not otherwise informed, people would likely believe that most parts of the recorded soliloquies are telephone conversations. By contrast, much of the Japanese data does not sound as if there is an interlocutor on the other end of the telephone. One of the causes of the impression that English soliloquy resembles ordinary conversation is the amount of the second person pronoun *you*. This section examines *you* in soliloquy in terms of several characteristics proposed in the works summarized in Section 6.2.

Table 1. *You* in soliloquy

Subj	Sex	Age	Word count	<i>you</i> subj	<i>your</i>	<i>you</i> obj	<i>yourself</i>	<i>you</i> know	<i>you</i> total	<i>I</i> subj
A	F	25	2,358	3		2	1	1	7	135
B	M	26	2,636	73	14	6	7	20	120	49
C	M	26	1,572	12		1		2	15	136
D	F	21	2,024	7			1	1	9	184
E	M	64	1,068	3				1	4	35
F	M	31	994	7					7	54
G	M	29	1,443	7	3			24	34	106
H	F	26	2,073	10	6	2		1	19	137
I	F	25	2,465	28		6		4	38	126
J	F	20	1,976	12				7	19	113
			18,609	162	23	17	9	61	272	1,075

Table 1 shows the frequency of the nominative (subjective), genitive, and accusative (objective) cases of *you*, as well as its reflexive form, *yourself*, and the interjectional expression *you know*. When *you* was repeated, they were counted as one, e.g. *YOU, uh, YOU adopt the cadence and the, the pronunciation, maybe even the crisp way of talking that's peculiar to the radio announcer*. The frequency counts of *I* are also provided for comparison. Undeniably, the frequency of *you* (and other related forms) varies significantly from speaker to speaker, as the frequency of

you know varies greatly among speakers in interpersonal communication. It is especially striking that Subject B used subjective *you* (73 times) more frequently than *I* (49 times).

The interactional discourse functions of *you know* have been studied (e.g. Schiffrin 1987, Overstreet 1999, Aijmer 2002, Fitzmaurice 2004). Although *you know* is not examined in this study, it is interesting to note that it also occurs in soliloquy, possibly as frequently as in conversations for many individuals. How its function differs between soliloquial and dialogic modes of speech is an interesting topic for future exploration.

6.4 The analysis of English soliloquy

6.4.1 Deictic *you*

Although participants in the present soliloquy experiment were explicitly requested not to talk to an imaginary addressee, several nevertheless did so. This kind of irregularity to be expected in social-science experiments.

- (24) a. *I have to admit I'm glad I don't do linguistics because, you mysterious listeners, I'm sure you, uh, don't feel the same way ...*
 b. *I wonder what kind of cross-cultural effects of soliloquy you can get.*
 c. *Oh yeah, there's actually one really cool airline that you should chose, if if uh, you, the addressee, who I'm not talking to, if one ever is interested in a cool airline one should try Virgin America.*
 d. *So I'm very excited about this camera, it just came in the mail. ... What else? I don't know I could tell you what I did today or I went hiking recently or I could tell you that the, I don't know. ... Could tell you good coffee shops to go to in Berkeley.*
 e. *Well, should I hold you in my hand then? I don't know. Can't pick this up. You're a pretty crappy recorder.*

In (24a–d), the intention of *you* was to address me, the experimenter, although I was not present at those recording sessions, so that no subjects knew who the experimenter was. I do not know why the subject in (24b) thought that the experiment was for a cross-cultural comparison of soliloquy, which is not quite accurate. In (24c), the first occurrence of *you* sounds impersonal; the subject then switched to deictic referencing. In (24e), *you* refers to my pricey digital recording device. There are 17 instances of such vocative deictic *you* in these data.

There also are six deictic *you*'s in quotation form:

- (25) a. *Can't believe they went to Hawaii without us, and they kept saying they were going to take us. They were always like, they always say that they're gonna be like, oh yeah, you can come with us, or we're all gonna go to this place or that place, and then, they they don't take us. They just go themselves ...*
 b. *I wish, I wish hair stylists would just decide for you, like say, okay, with the shape of your soccer-ball faced head, you should have bangs, or you shouldn't have bangs, or whatever.*
 c. *I don't think I know anyone in China other than C, J, and S. ... Maybe I should pretend to know somebody. If I see any, if I see any American just be like oh my god do you remember blah blah blah.*
 d. *Somebody once said to me, when I said something like that, that just means you were uncool, not that you were a trendsetter, and I think that's fair.*

In (25a), the subject complained about her parents, who had gone to Hawaii without her sister and her. The deictic *you* occurs inside the quoted parents' utterance indicating that they always say they are willing to travel with their children, referred to by *you*, but they actually do not take them. In (25b), the subject wanted her hair stylist to tell her what style best suits her (= *you*). In (25c), the subject was talking about a trip to China, where she knew only three people. She thought about pretending to know them when she found Americans, saying "Oh my god, do you remember ..." In (25d), the subject recalled that someone told him (= *you*) his speech was neither trendy nor stylish.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Kuroda (1979/1992) concludes from his own introspection that second person pronouns can be used in soliloquy in the form of a pseudo-conversation to refer to the speaker him/herself, e.g.:

- (26) *Omae wa nanto bakana koto o shitan da.*
 you TOP how stupid thing ACC did
 'What a stupid thing you [the speaker] did!'

This usage is fairly common in literature. The examples in (27) are taken from Molly Bloom's Soliloquy in James Joyce's *Ulysses*, presumably derived from Joyce's self observation of his own inner speech, i.e. thought (emphases added).

- (27) a. *... either it was one of those night women if it was down there he was really and the hotel story he made up a pack of lies to hide it planning it Hynes kept me who did I meet ah yes I met do you remember Menton and who else who let me see that big baby face ...*
 b. *... he used to make fun of when he commenced kissing me on the choir stairs after I sang Gounods Ave Maria what are we waiting for O my heart kiss me straight on the brow and part which is my brown part he was pretty hot*

for all his tinny voice too my low notes he was always raving about if you can believe him ...

- c. ... *suppose I never came back what would they say eloped with him that gets you on on the stage ...*

However, this rather dramatic intrapersonal deictic *you* is rare in actual soliloquy. Out of 211 occurrences of *you*'s (excluding *you know*'s), only six instances qualify as such.

- (28) a. *What do people do with all these extra cables? I don't know what they do with them. I just don't know what they do, and I have to get that out and clean that up. So, this, VCR goes with this Sony. Maybe the Sony, uh, yeah, I bet that the Sony remote that I threw away goes with that Sony TV. What do you, what do you think? I bet it does.* [You is repeated here; thus the two *you*'s are counted as one occurrence.]
- b. *Think I used to talk to myself more. Think I used to spend a lot more time verbalizing like that. I think it might be travel that broke me of that habit. Can't imagine why you'd think I'd want to hear English more when I'm traveling somewhere. Think I just spent that learning to listen. Now I just don't talk as much.*
- c. *What do you think what would happen if you painted your arm in nail polish? You think you'd get really hot? I suppose, because it would block your pores from sweating.*

In (28a), the subject was cleaning his office, discarding unwanted items. He was uncertain whether he had thrown away the remote control of the Sony TV and tried to remember by asking himself a question. While the *you* in (28b) likely refers to the subject himself, the utterance is difficult to interpret. Preceding this utterance, the subject talked about an academic course that he would take the following semester. He then suddenly realized that he used to soliloquize more frequently; he attributed this break in his habit to traveling. His internal logic remains unclear. Regarding (28c), one could consider the instances of *you* as impersonal; however, it would be more natural to interpret them as intrapersonal.

Possible implications of the rarity of intrapersonal deictic *you* will be discussed in Section 6.5.

6.4.2 Indefinite *you*

Excluding *you know*'s and deictic *you*'s, a total of 185 indefinite *you*'s were obtained. Of Whitley's (1978) seven constraints on the impersonal uses of personal pronouns, III and VII are about *they* and IV is about *we* and thus not relevant to

our discussion. Regarding Constraint II, our data contain no examples of indefinite *you* followed by a relative clause or conjoined with another NP. Therefore, although Bolinger's counterarguments are plausible, such occurrences appear to be rare. Similarly, there is no instance of *you* that follows a partitive (e.g. *some of, all of*; Constraint V). The data contain only counter-examples to Constraint I, i.e. indefinite *you* can be stressed, as Bolinger (1979) has already refuted with his constructed counter-examples:

- (29) [Talking about computer games]
It's also disappointing because if it might be okay to lose at the beginning as long as yóu, you know, get up to speed, yóu learn, but being overtaken is entirely bad because, then not only do you begin losing, but yóu, uh, have failed at learning too. Somebody else is learning better than yóu, and that's a bit disappointing.

Let us next examine the co-occurrence of the indefinite *you* and the present progressive form. As mentioned, the present progressive typically expresses a specific event and, thus, is incompatible with indefinite *you*, whose function is to express a norm (Bolinger 1979). Or, in Kitagawa and Lehrer's (1990) terms, they do not co-occur because indefinite *you* is normally selected in descriptions of structural knowledge – except for the *life drama* rhetorical style – but the present progressive normally expresses phenomenal knowledge.

In our data, of 162 *you*'s in the subject position, 18 occurred with predicates in the present progressive form. However, these instances are all in subordinate clauses or in other positions where present progressive primarily marks aspect, rather than tense, as exemplified below:

- (30) a. *There's also, I think, when you're talking into a recorder, there's probably like a, an unconscious modulation of your of your tone of voice because you want to be heard probably sort of like you're when you're trying to use your telephone, you know. You have an interlocutor. They can sort of uh they can tell you when they can't hear you.*
- b. *What do you think what would happen if you painted your arm in nail polish? You think you'd get really hot? ... it could look kinda cool but it would be hard to get off. That's pretty gross. Your body would absorb it. ... I'm sure it does cause like your nails can turn color like yellow if you're cooking with curry.*
- c. *You feel almost like you're taking dictation when you speak.*
- d. *... having said that, you know what's so what what what are you doing when you make a joke for your own benefit?*

The idea conveyed in (30a) is the human tendency perceived by the speaker that one unconsciously adjusts one's voice in order to be understood by the

interlocutor(s). The *when* clauses with the present progressive form here add temporal condition as to when this tendency manifests itself. Because the main idea is expressed with indefinite *you*, the subordinate-clause subjects agree with it anaphorically or cataphorically. The first half of (30b) has already been presented as (28c), where the *you*'s were identified as deictic. Starting with *Your body would absorb it*, the *you*'s appear to be generic, and, as in (30a), the *you* in the *if*-clause is an anaphor. Similarly, the phrases *you're taking dictation* in (30c) and *what are you doing* in (30d) do not refer to specific events, but to event types perceived as imperfective, rather than perfective.

Therefore, Bolinger's (1979) and Kitagawa and Lehrer's (1990) generalizations are valid in the present soliloquy data.

6.5 Soliloquy and inner speech

6.5.1 Inner speech vs. mentalese

This section addresses an esoteric issue associated with the essential role of soliloquy, revealed by the use of *you*, with respect to dyadic discourse on the one hand and inner speech on the other. It is argued that soliloquy, which is located between the two, does not seem to support the thesis that identifies thought with *internal conversation*. In order to search for a trace of internal conversation manifested in soliloquial outer speech, I will first clarify the distinction between outer speech and inner speech and then explore the self-referencing *you*'s in the soliloquy data.

The nature of the medium in which thought takes place has long been a matter of debate: in natural language or variation thereof (i.e. *inner speech*) or in an innate, non-natural language in the form of propositional representation (i.e. *mentalese*). Fodor (1975) favors the mentalese hypothesis, arguing first that animals without language nevertheless think, as evidenced in the observed phenomenon that they can learn, solve problems, and understand their environments (pp. 56–58). His second argument is that when children acquire natural language, they need to form hypotheses about the meaning of expressions to which they are exposed, for normally grammatical rules are not explicitly taught to them. Such hypothesis-making and testing activities must be performed in some pre-existing medium because natural language has not yet been acquired (pp. 58–64). In this view, speaking consists of translation from mentalese into public, natural language. However, we can never be consciously aware of mentalese when we think; therefore, no direct evidence can be found for its existence.

Pinker (1994) also rejects natural language as a medium of thought when he writes:

“We have all had the experience of uttering or writing a sentence, then stopping and realizing that it wasn't exactly what we meant to say. To have that feeling, there has to be what we meant to say that is different from what we said.” (p. 57)

That is, we may have something to say which differs from what is actually expressed by means of natural language. That something, he contends, must be represented in mentalese. He also points out that we normally remember the gist of what we have heard, but not the exact wording. Therefore, there must be some representation system in our brain distinct from natural language.

Countering the mentalese hypothesis, Cole (1999) argues that some thought, especially abstract thought, essentially involves natural language. Regarding the argument based on the comparison between humans and other organisms, he asserts:

“Spiders, for example, build marvelous things, but no inference to spiderese appears to be warranted. There simply is much we don't understand about how even unintelligent organisms accomplish what they do ...” (p. 285)

He addresses the argument involving the discrepancy between an intended meaning and the actual utterance by comparing that situation to drawing: while we have some mental image, our drawings may fall short of what was intended due to our lack of skills. Similarly, an utterance may fail in execution to express a mental image we wanted to express in words (p. 287). The fact that we remember only the gist, not the exact words in the exact order, only indicates that we do not retain a detailed syntactic description of language we hear (*ibid.*). Cole concludes that none of the arguments allegedly supporting the mentalese hypothesis assures that natural language is *not* used in thought. Furthermore, to use the same medium for internal processing and external communication is arguably more efficient because it avoids the overhead of translation (p. 294).

As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, Vygotsky (1934/1986) has theorized that children first learn language for social communication and eventually develop it into subvocalized inner speech, i.e. into thought – a process that stabilizes during the early school years. According to his account, private speech is a link between these two functions of language. Therefore, apparently Vygotsky is an adherent of the natural language hypothesis, although he does not equate inner speech and thought. “[T]hought does not express itself in words, but rather realizes itself in them” (1986: 251). He conjectures that, as private speech develops into internal thought, it becomes increasingly abbreviated and cryptic. Typically, the subject of a sentence is already known to the speaker; therefore, it tends to

become elliptical, resulting in predication alone (pp. 266–268). (For thorough discussions of earlier studies of inner speech, see Sokolov 1972.)

Although the natural language hypothesis seems more empirically verifiable than the mentales hypothesis, there is very little research on the linguistic characteristics of inner speech. De Guerrero (2005:9) remarks:

“The empirical study of inner speech has forever constituted a methodological challenge. As a covert, intangible, elusive, and highly dynamic phenomenon, inner speech has always escaped direct observation, and its investigation has therefore remained at a theoretical, mostly philosophical level.”

She emphasizes that inner speech *is* spoken language, i.e. language in action rather than language as abstraction. Inner speech is not a type of internal language with a collection of morphosyntactic knowledge nor is it a network of meanings residing somewhere in the recesses of the mind. She conceptualizes inner speech as *utility* of language for verbal thinking *in action* (pp. 14, 17).

Johnson (1994: 177–179) posits four features of inner speech:

- i. it is silent,
- ii. it contains many syntactic ellipses,
- iii. word meanings are highly condensed,
- iv. it is egocentric, i.e. word meanings are highly personalized.

Adopting these four features, Wiley (2006a) attempts to discover more specific contours of inner speech. He hypothesizes that inner speech is a distinct variation of ordinary language,⁵ but that it is imagistic, where non-linguistic elements – visual imagery, tactile sensations, emotion, kinesthetics, smells, tastes, and sounds – may substitute for parts of a sentence and exist alongside linguistic elements. For instance, when we are thinking about cooking, we might get the sensory imagery of our favorite food or grocery store. When such imagery enters our brain, we already have a stimulus that can function syntactically. We use a simple one-word sentence “shop,” which does not require the subject or any modification because such information is already supplied by mental imagery (p. 321). Thus, inner speech is more iconic than outer speech, which is quite conventionalized and arbitrary.

According to Wiley, both the syntax and semantics of inner speech are simpler than those associated with outer speech. The syntax is highly elliptical, using fewer words – which makes inner speech much faster than outer speech. The semantics of inner speech is also simpler, including smaller, more condensed and

5. However, “a clear distinction between inner and outer speech is impossible, because the very act of introspection is modeled on external social discourse” (Voloshinov 1929/1973: 36).

egocentric vocabulary. In outer speech, we are reluctant to use the same words repeatedly, but this is not relevant for inner speech. Furthermore, adjectives and other modifiers are usually dispensed with because their functions are compensated for by non-linguistic elements (p. 323). Additionally, concern for oneself pervades inner speech:

“One is one’s own dictionary, i.e. one can use words in ways that are peculiar to one’s own emotional habits, desires or personal slang. Each person has his or her own biography, and along this road there are lots of major, sometimes life-changing, events. These events are the stuff of one’s personal mythology.” (p. 324)

Wiley reports that he knew a man named “Tom,” who possessed the most engaging trust-inspiring smile. His smile was very powerful, and he had to be betrayed several times until he realized that Tom’s smile was a big lie and his major weapon for obtaining what he wanted. Wiley now sometimes in his inner speech says to himself, “He’s another Tom,” or a condensed “Tom!” (p. 339).

6.5.2 The dialogic nature of inner speech

The idea that internal monologues are by nature dialogic has been assumed by many scholars (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.1).⁶ It has frequently been asserted that humans pursue meaning by a dialogical method, which is enacted both publicly via interpersonal and communal dialogue and privately by virtue of inner speech or the dialogical self (Wiley 2006b:5). Mead asserts this idea as:

6. This conceptualization of thinking as an internal dialogue dates back to ancient Greece. In *Theaetetus* by Plato, Socrates says, “I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking – asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken, – I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you?” (translation by Benjamin Jowett; available at Project Gutenberg). This is a popular stance, but not uniformly agreed upon. For example, Husserl (1999: 30–31) writes, “One of course speaks, in a certain sense, even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to think of oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to oneself, as, e.g. when someone says to himself: ‘You have gone wrong, you can’t go on like that.’ But in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating. In a monologue, words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment.”

“The self, as that which can be an object to itself,⁷ is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience. After a self has arisen, it in a certain sense provides for itself its social experiences, and so we can conceive of an absolutely solitary self. But it is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience. When it has arisen we can think of a person in solitary confinement for the rest of his life, but who still has himself as a companion, and is able to think and to converse with himself as he had communicated with others.” (Mead 1934: 140)

“The stuff that goes to make up the ‘me’ whom the ‘I’ addressed and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this action of the ‘I’. If the ‘I’ speaks, the ‘me’ hears. If the ‘I’ strikes, the ‘me’ feels the blow.” (Mead 1913/1964: 143)

For Mead, ‘me’ consists of all former ‘I’s – i.e. the me is the I’s past – and the conceptualization that ‘I’ is a subject and ‘me’ is an object is not a mere linguistic fact, but, rather, reflects an extra-linguistic reality, viz. reflexivity.

Peirce, on the other hand, conceives of thoughts as always proceeding in dialogue form of and addressed to one’s future self as a second person, *you* (Wiley 1994: 42). Therefore, his notion of internal dialogue is closer to being isomorphic with interpersonal dialogue between two free-standing conversationalists. Mead’s ‘me’, being objectified by ‘I’ as well as being the I’s past, is already determined and not free (pp. 46, 49).

The contention that the self is a social construct is quite credible; likewise, the social origins of inner speech via private speech. Mead (1934: 149) is employing the term *communication* theoretically: a symbol that has arisen in one’s self is made to arise in the other individual. In this strict sense, the commonality of inter- and intra-personal communication may be admissible. However, equating dyadic conversations with soliloquy, let alone with thought, emerges as an unwarranted oversimplification.

The fact that conversations with other individuals normally create a flow of new information is paramount. By contrast, soliloquy, or intrapersonal “communication,” can generate new information only thorough inference derived from pre-existing knowledge. Clearly, an entirely new piece of information cannot thereby be obtained. (We ignore in this discussion information obtainable by visual or auditory sensation.) This unpredictability of incoming information in interpersonal communication and of the interlocutor’s intention leads to an uncertain outcome. Therefore, the phatic function of language is extremely important,⁸ sometimes even

7. By taking an objective, impersonal attitude (i.e. the attitudes of other individuals) toward him/herself, an individual becomes an object to him/herself (Mead 1934: 138).

8. According to Jakobson (1960/1987), verbal communication is composed of six factors: (1) a context (the world in which the message takes place) and a co-text (the other verbal signs

more important than the referential one, in interpersonal communication, but it is simply irrelevant in soliloquy.

Wiley’s (1994) model of inner speech is particularly important in considering these issues, for he hypothesizes that internal conversation is *structurally similar* to language, although not *identical* to it (p. 59), and he integrates Mead’s *me* and Peirce’s *you*, referred to as the *I-you-me Model*. This idea is illustrated by his analysis of the soliloquy, “I’d better get the DPOs [departmental purchase orders] for the new supplies. Oh no! We’re not using those any more” (p. 61). *I’d better get the DPOs ...* is an instance of the I talking to Peirce’s *you*, telling the future self what to do. In the second half of this utterance, “the *you*, previously addressed, has moved down the time-line and is now in the place of the I” (ibid.). In this case, the addressees are simultaneously the *me* and the new *you*. This part, a moment ago answering the I, and now the *me-as-past*, is informing that the DPOs are now an obsolete procedure.

This line of analysis – to attribute each utterance in soliloquy to the I, *you*, and *me* – seems not impossible. However, if language users whenever thinking do in fact normally split themselves into two or three personae and mimic interpersonal communication, it would be reasonable to expect such a behavior to be manifested in the use of *you* to refer to the split self. Soliloquy is vocalized speech, and it is therefore conducted in outer, not inner, speech. However, it is nonetheless closer to inner speech than public outer speech in the sense that it is not conversation with another individual. Many aspects indispensable in public outer speech are irrelevant and are thus absent in soliloquy. Accordingly, soliloquy should display more traces of inner speech compared with public outer speech.

We have noted in Section 6.4.1 that deictic *you* for the split-self occurs in soliloquy. Out of the total 211 occurrences, six occurrences were found, as recorded in (28). However, four of them occurred in a single stretch of utterance, in (28c), resulting in only three separate instances. I consider this number insufficient to support the hypothesis that internal speech is conversational. I contend that the characterization of inner speech as internal conversation is simply metaphorical, not literally reflecting reality.

in the same message), (2) an addresser, (3) an addressee, (4) a contact between an addresser and addressee, (5) a common code and (6) a message. He posits six functions of language: the *referential* function operates between the message and context; the *emotive* function operates between the message and addresser; the *conative* function, between the message and addressee; the *phatic* function between the message and contact; the *metalingual* function, between the message and code; the *poetic* function focuses on the message for its own sake. A phatic expression is one whose only function is to perform a social task, as opposed to conveying information. The term was coined by anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski in the early 1900s.

Nevertheless, this metaphor is so powerful that it makes conceiving otherwise difficult. The cause of such confusion may well be that in a spoken exchange with another individual, our mental state is constantly reconstructed by virtue of the acquisition of new information. Thinking also changes our mental states in a fashion similar to when we talk with other people. Therefore, we tend to perceive, metaphorically, that thinking is talking to oneself.

Recall Moriyama's (1997) claim, presented in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.7. He argues that some sentences are natural only when used in communicative settings, not in soliloquy. Unlike non-linguistic thoughts, linguistic thoughts must be processed linearly. Therefore, for utterances to qualify, i.e. sound natural, as soliloquy, they must express a progression of thoughts (p. 176). At the moment when one finishes an utterance that expresses a thought, some other thought must be present in one's awareness, i.e. a progression of thought. Soliloquy reflects the speaker's internal activities of information processing. When the content of one's awareness has not changed, indicating that the content of awareness is self-evident, no progression of thought is involved.

As Moriyama explicates, soliloquy is the expression of a progression of thought, and this mental activity is so prominent that we can easily be consciously aware of it whenever we converse with others. This is the reason that the metaphor of "thinking is conversing with oneself" prevails. Nevertheless, dyadic conversation is very different from the internal activity of thinking. Although it is possible for us to mimic dialogues intrapersonally by splitting oneself and referring to one part with *I* and to the other with *you*, this dramatic monologue does not occur as a norm.

It is not my intention to claim that Mead's (1913/1964, 1934) I-me distinction is totally fictitious. Objectified self (me) does exist, and I and me have some interaction, which can be called "communication." However, although this human behavior exhibits some commonality with dialogue with another individual, the differences between the two activities are so diverse that using the same term is nor appropriate. The mind-internal activity is more accurately described as an attempt to make one's model of the world coherent, rather than communicating with another self because I can talk to me, but me, as objectified self, never responds. The next subsection continues this discussion.

6.5.3 Publicness in soliloquy

In Hirose and Hasegawa (2010), we examined some of the soliloquy data presented in this book as well as instances appearing in Japanese novels of *ishiki byooshitsu* (representing consciousness), e.g. the bold portion in (31a), and *shinnai hatsuwa* (internal speech), e.g. the bold part in (31b):

- (31) a. *Nobuo wa hitsuzen to iu kotoba o omotta.*
 TOP necessity QUOT word ACC thought
Jibun wa hitsuzen-teki sonzai nano ka,
 TOP necessary existence COP Q
guuzen-teki sonzai nano ka.
 accidental
 'Nobuo thought about the word "necessity." Am I a necessary existence or an accidental one?' (Ayako Miura, *Shiokari Tooge* 'Shiokari Pass')
- b. *Futto Natsue wa, nikki kara me o*
 suddenly TOP diary from eye ACC
sorashite, kangaeru me ni natta. (naze, watashi
 turn-away think eye became why I
ya kodomo no koto o nikki ni kakanai no kashira)
 and child about ACC diary in write-not NMLZ I-wonder
 'Suddenly, Natsuko turned her eyes away from the diary and started thinking. "Why doesn't he write about me and children?"'
 (Ayako Miura, *Kyooten* 'Freezing Point')

In (31a), the author directly depicts in the narrative voice the protagonist's thought (in *shinnaigo* in the *kokugogaku* tradition).⁹ In (31b), the protagonist's thought is conveyed to the reader as her internal speech (the author uses parentheses to differentiate internal speech from outer, public speech).¹⁰ Bill and Sheila Fearnough translate (31a) using the free indirect style: "Nobuo remembered the word 'necessity'. Was his existence a matter of necessity or a matter of chance?" (emphasis added).¹¹

Represented consciousness is a depiction of a character's thought, which is supposed to be pre-linguistic, interpreted by the narrator, whereas internal speech

9. Yamaguchi (1951:34) defines *shinnaigo* as comprehension/interpretation of linguistic expressions, rather than a special form of language.

10. I provide *internal speech* as the gloss for *shinnai hatsuwa*. It sounds similar to *inner speech*; however, inner speech equates with thought, which need not be linguistic. On the other hand, *shinnai hatsuwa* is necessarily linguistic. The distinction between thought and language (some linguistic form) is indeed murky and awaits rigorous empirical investigation.

11. Free indirect style (known in French as *le style indirect libre*) is a widely adopted literary technique in third-person narrative for representing a character's thought. It combines the person and tense of indirect discourse (e.g. *she would arrive*) with expressions of time and place, among other things, appropriate to direct discourse (e.g. *here, tomorrow*): *She would arrive here tomorrow*. This form allows a third-person narrative to incorporate a first-person point of view. In Bill and Sheila Fearnough's translation, the person who questions is not the narrator, but the protagonist, and yet, the protagonist is referred to as *he*, not as *I*.

is necessarily linguistic. Normally, novels do not distinguish whether internal speech is at the sub-vocal level or actually vocalized (i.e. soliloquy). Therefore, we can assume that soliloquy in Japanese novels is regarded as a type of internal speech.

In Hirose and Hasegawa (2010), we then consider *the degree of publicness*: i.e. dialogue (most public) > internal speech > represented consciousness (least public). We hypothesize that normal dialogue consists mainly of public expressions (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4), whereas represented consciousness does not assume a hearer and consists exclusively of private expressions. In internal speech, these two kinds of expressions can freely coexist.

We also hypothesize that *jibun* 'self' is a private expression, used regardless of the speaker's gender, whereas *ore* and *boku* 'male first-person pronoun' are public expressions. Normally, both *boku* and *ore* appear in dialogue, *ore* appears in internal speech, and *jibun* appears in represented consciousness. Therefore, the degree of publicness is highest with *boku*, and lowest with *jibun*. These characteristics are illustrated in (32), all cited from Ayako Miura's *Shiokari Tooge* 'Shiokari Pass', where all of *boku*, *ore*, and *jibun* refer to the same protagonist, Nobuo.

- (32) a. Dialogue
 "Ano ne, Fujiko-san" Nobuo wa omoikitte itta.
 well TOP decisively said
 "Boku wa Asahikawa ni tenkin ni nattan desu..."
 I TOP to was-transferred
 "Well, Fujiko," Nobuo said decisively. "I've been transferred to Asahikawa."
- b. Internal Speech
 (Ore mo, kesshite fukoo ja nai zo) Nobuo wa
 I too at-all miserable COP-not SFP TOP
 daigaku ni ikenai koto mo kesshite fukoo
 college to cannot-go NMLZ too at-all miserable
 de wa nai to kokoro kara soo omotta.
 COP-not QUOT heart from so thought
 '(I'm not miserable at all.) Nobuo thought from the bottom of his heart that his being unable to attend college was not a miserable situation.'
- c. Represented Consciousness
 Nobuo wa kurikaeshite nido yonda. Jibun wa
 TOP repeatedly twice read self TOP
 hatashite hoka no hito no tame ni inochi o
 really other people GEN for life ACC
 suteru hodo no ai o motsu koto ga
 abandon as-much-as love ACC possess NMLZ NOM

dekiru daroo ka.

able wonder

'Nobuo read [a passage in the Bible] twice. Could he [= I] love other people so much that he would be able to give up his life for them?'

When a public expression appears in internal speech, it sounds as if the speaker were speaking to another individual whose image is activated in his/her mind; when a private expression is used, it sounds like a pseudo-conversation with self.

A distinction resembling that between represented consciousness and internal speech can be observed in soliloquy. There are two kinds of soliloquial expressions: those which represent a speaker's direct reflection of perception, e.g. (33), and those which express somewhat more elaborate cognition, e.g. (34).

- (33) a. *Uwaa, haiku toka. Aayuu no yada.*
 gee and-alike that-kind thing dislike
 'Gee, haiku books. I hate them!' (Chapter 1, (30a))
- b. *Eeto, a, sugee. Hon ga ippai daa.*
 well wow book NOM many COP
 'Well, wow. A lot of books!' (Chapter 1, (32b))
- c. [Looking at a magazine]
Kore doko daroo. Hasedera. Kanagawa-ken, huun.
 this where I-wonder Kanagawa-prefecture hmm
 'Where is it? Hase temple. In Kanagawa, ok.' (Chapter 1, (34a))
- d. *Hee, pawaa adaputaa kekkoo okkii. Kooyuu no*
 hmm power-adapter fairly big this-kind-of-thing
wa chotto yada naa.
 TOP a-little like-not SFP
 'Well, the power adapter is big. I don't like this type.' (Chapter 2, (15a))
- (34) a. *Demo ne, Mishima toka Kawabata toka wa, sono,*
 but INTJ and like TOP well
riidaa o erandete, ii to omounda yona.
 reader ACC select good QUOT think SFP
 'But an author like Mishima or Kawabata, uh, selects his own readers. I think that's good.' (Chapter 2, (15e))
- b. *Asoko no toshokan, ookikute kireide ii ne.*
 there GEN library large clean good SFP
 'That library is large and clean, so it's good.' (Chapter 2, (15f))
- c. *Nichiyooobi, nichiyooobi nanka atta yoona*
 Sunday something existed like

ki ga surunda yonee.

I-feel SFP

'Sunday, I think there's something on Sunday.' (Chapter 2, (15i))

- d. [Concerning how many additional minutes she had to talk in the experiment]

E, mada 32-fun? A, atchi no tokei

oh still 32-minutes well that clock

34-pun ka. Jaa ato 6-pun? E,

34-minutes Q then remaining 6-minutes uh

itsu kara hajimeta-kke.

when from started-SFP

'Oh, it's still 32 minutes after? Well, that clock says 34. Then, still 6 minutes to go? Uh, when did I start?' (Chapter 2, (15p))

The first type of utterances, e.g. (33), are those normally judged by native speakers of Japanese as soliloquies without further context. By contrast, the second type, e.g. (34), cannot be so judged without contextual information. That is, they can also be interpreted as part of dialogues.

We construe this fact as an indicator of publicness; the examples in (34) express a higher degree of publicness than those in (33). As mentioned earlier, this fact can be identified metaphorically as communication with self. Nevertheless, it is one-way communication, fundamentally different from dialogue.

6.6 Summary

Chapter 6 commenced with an overview of the research that has been accomplished on the subject of indefinite use of *you*, whose major function is to express some norm, as perceived by the speaker and projected to people in general. However, the interpretation of *you* is not as general as *anyone* or *everyone*. Rather, those referred to by indefinite *you* are observers or commentators in present time. The impersonal *you* has been considered as a *courtesy device*, inviting the addressee to share with the speaker a viewpoint. It thus extends a sense of camaraderie. The generality of impersonal *you* varies from straightforward generic statements that serve as event-oriented structural knowledge descriptions, to life drama narratives.

Although all first, second, and third person pronouns can be used for indefinite reference, when referring to people in general, such uses are not completely devoid of their basic indexical notions. Furthermore, people sometimes use *you* to refer to themselves, motivated simply by a desire to avoid frequent uses of *I*, which may sound too egocentric.

Section 6.4 examined the experimental soliloquy data. Although the present progressive form can co-occur with indefinite *you* in soliloquy, in such cases, it expresses aspect, not tense, and so does not denote a specific event. This supports the hypothesis that *you* occurs in a description of normal events, or expressed differently, it is compatible with descriptions of structural knowledge. We also found that the use of intrapersonal deictic *you* for mimicking dyadic conversation is extremely rare in soliloquy.

Section 6.5 was devoted to a discussion as to whether soliloquy, and, in turn, thought, are appropriately characterized as internal conversation. It was pointed out that the frequency of the deictic *you* used to refer to a split self is too low to justify the inference that thought normally equates to internal conversation. The idea that thought is inner conversation is a metaphor, albeit a deep-seated one, not describing reality. But this metaphor is difficult to refute. If the soliloquy data had contained many tokens of deictic, self-referencing *you*, it would have been possible to determine with certainty that soliloquy is indeed dialogic, and perhaps thought as well. By contrast, the fact that such use of *you* is extremely rare in soliloquy does not by itself verify the hypothesis that it is *not* dialogic. I, therefore, propose a weaker assertion – that our thought is not necessarily in the form of dialogue.

We have also reexamined the Japanese soliloquy data with respect to the idea of dialogic nature of thought. We recognize two types of soliloquy: one that consists exclusively of private expressions to vocalize the speaker's reaction to currently perceived reality, and the other, which has a higher degree of publicness than the first. The second type can be considered metaphorically as communication with self. However, it is crucial to be aware that such communication is by nature drastically different from ordinary dialogue.