Deictic and anaphoric uses of the Japanese demonstratives ko-so-a∗

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This paper analyzes the ko-so-a demonstratives in Japanese as they occur in experimentally-obtained soliloquy data. In soliloquy, the Japanese deixis system consists of a two-way opposition, viz. ko- vs. a-. So- appears only as an anaphor; its antecedent can be either familiar or unfamiliar to the speaker, contrary to Kuno’s (1973) analysis. It is also argued that ko- and a- are always deictic in soliloquy. Adopting Chafe’s (1994) theory of consciousness, it is hypothesized that (i) a- is used when the referent is in the speaker’s peripheral consciousness, and (ii) ko- is used to refer to an entity if it is already focused at the moment of speech. Finally, it is demonstrated that so- and a- exhibit the attributive-referential distinction, which is proposed by Donnellan (1966).

Areas of interest: deixis, anaphora, demonstrative, soliloquy

1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the ko-so-a demonstratives in Japanese as they occur in the experimentally-obtained soliloquy data. Soliloquy (hitorigoto in Japanese) is utterance of thoughts not addressed to another individual; it is sometimes considered as talking to oneself. Because these demonstratives have customarily been characterized according to the regions and relative positions of entities in a physical space relative to the speaker and the addressee, an examination of how they behave when no addressee is present is of particular interest.

The balance of this introductory section briefly describes the Japanese demonstrative system, while Section 2 explicates my data-collection method. In Section 3, it will be demonstrated that in soliloquy, the Japanese deixis system consists of a two-way opposition, viz. ko- (proximal) vs. a- (distal). So- (medial) appears only as an anaphor in soliloquy, in which its antecedent can be either familiar or unfamiliar to the speaker, contrary to Kuno’s (1973) analysis of anaphoric so-. It will also be argued that in soliloquy, ko- and a- are always deictic. Adopting Chafe’s (1994) theory of consciousness, it is hypothesized that (i) a- is used deictically when the referent is in the speaker’s peripheral consciousness, i.e., in a semiactive mental state, and (ii) ko- is used to refer deictically to an entity if it is already focused and thus in an active state at the moment of speech. Section 4 discusses the notions of deixis and anaphora as well as difficulties involved in dichotomizing them. Section 5 demonstrates that so- and a- exhibit the attributive-referential distinction, proposed by Donnellan (1966); Section 6 concludes this paper.

1.1. Deictic use of demonstratives
Conventional grammars describe Japanese demonstratives as encoding a three-way distinction, referred to as the ko-, so-, and a-series. Deictically, when the speaker and addressee are physically facing in the same direction, the ko-series—e.g., kore (pronominal), kono (adnominal) ‘this’—is used for entities located close to them, the so-series—e.g., sore (pronominal), sono (adnominal) ‘that’—is used for those at some

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distance from them, and the \textit{a-series}—\textit{e.g.}, \textit{are} (pronominal), \textit{ano} (adnominal) ‘that, which is way over there’—for those at an even greater distance. This characterization of \textit{ko-so-a} is referred to as the \textit{Distance Model}.

On the other hand, when the speaker and the addressee are facing each other, the \textit{ko-series} is used to refer to entities near the speaker, whereas the \textit{so-series} is used for entities near the addressee, and the \textit{a-series} for those at a distance from both of them. This analysis is called the \textit{Territory Model}.

The utility of the Distance and Territory Models has been widely recognized. However, \textit{Mikami} (1970/1992) challenges these models by claiming that \textit{ko-so-a} do not form a \textit{triplet}, but, rather, a \textit{double binary}: \textit{i.e.}, \textit{ko-} vs. \textit{so-} on the one hand, and \textit{ko-} vs. \textit{a-} on the other. He provides, as supporting evidence, lexical patterns and fixed phrases. There are phrases combining \textit{a-} and \textit{ko-} as well as \textit{so-} and \textit{ko-}, but never \textit{so-} and \textit{a-}.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{a-} + \textit{ko-} \textit{are-kore} ‘this and that’, \textit{areka-koreka} ‘this or that’, \textit{achira-kochira} ‘here and there’, \textit{atchi-kotchi} ‘here and there’
\item \textit{so-} + \textit{ko-} \textit{soko-koko} ‘here and there’, \textit{sonna-konna de} ‘because of this and that’, \textit{sore to kore to wa hanashi ga chigau} ‘this and that one are different stories’, \textit{soo-koo suru uchi ni} ‘while doing this and that’
\item \textit{a-} + \textit{so-} none
\end{enumerate}

\textit{Mikami} explains that the fundamental opposition in communicative situations consists of the speaker and the addressee, who divide the metaphorically-conceived space into two sub-spaces. This opposition is represented by \textit{ko-} (the speaker’s territory) and \textit{so-} (the addressee’s territory). So far, this is identical with the Territory Model. What differs is that the concept of \textit{a-} is totally absent in this part of \textit{Mikami’s} framework. When the speaker and the addressee face in the same direction, whether physically or metaphorically, they perceive themselves together in opposition to others. In this conceptualization, the joint territory of the speaker and addressee is expressed by \textit{ko-}, and that of the others by \textit{a-}. Therefore, in \textit{Mikami’s} theory, \textit{ko-} and \textit{so-} oppose each other as do \textit{ko-} and \textit{a-}, but there is no opposition between \textit{so-} and \textit{a-}. He claims further that the two oppositions differ in nature, and that therefore these three demonstratives never oppose each other in the same interactional context.

\subsection*{1.2. Anaphoric use of demonstratives}
\textit{Kuno} (1973: 282-290) makes the generalization that \textit{ko-} is used only deictically, but that \textit{so-} and \textit{a-} can be used either deictically or anaphorically. For deictic usage, \textit{Kuno} subscribes to the Territory Model. For anaphoric usage, he considers that \textit{so-} is selected either (i) when the speaker does not know the referent well (\textit{i.e.}, the speaker has only \textit{indirect} knowledge) or (ii) when the speaker does know the referent well (\textit{i.e.}, s/he has \textit{direct} knowledge) but nevertheless assumes that the addressee does not, as exemplified in (2a). By contrast, \textit{a-} is selected when the speaker believes that both s/he and the addressee know the referent well, as in (2b).

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. \textit{Kinoo Yamada-san to iu hito ni aimashita. Sono (#Ano) hito michi ni mayotte komatte ita node, tasukete agemashita.} ‘Yesterday, I met a man named Yamada. Because he [\textit{that} person] was having difficulty finding his way, I helped him.’
\item b. \textit{Kinoo Yamada-san ni aimashita. Ano (#Sono) hito itsumo genki desu ne.} ‘Yesterday, I met Mr. Yamada. He [\textit{that} person] is always in great spirits.’
\end{enumerate}
The phrase *to iu hito* ‘a person named’ in (2a) signals that the speaker believes that the addressee does not know Yamada. In such a case, according to Kuno, the use of *sono* is appropriate, but *ano* is not. In (2b), by contrast, the absence of *to iu hito* indicates that the speaker assumes that the addressee has direct knowledge of Yamada. In this case, *ano* is appropriate, but *sono* is anomalous.

Kuroda (1979/1992) examined the use of *ko-so-a* in (constructed) soliloquy and found cases that counter-exemplify Kuno’s generalizations. He questions whether language use should always be accounted for in terms of communication, in which the presence of an addressee is always presumed. If we subscribe to a communicative explanation, Kuroda cautions, we need to be aware that some characteristics of language use are likely derived from *the communicative setting itself*, rather than from the properties of the expressions under consideration.

In order to examine the use of demonstratives in soliloquy, Kuroda eliminates the addressee from Kuno’s analysis. Then, when used anaphorically, *a-* should be appropriate when the speaker knows the referent well, and *so-* when s/he does not. Regarding the deictic usage, the elimination of the addressee predicts that *ko-* should be used for a nearby entity, and *a-* for a distant entity, with *so-* absent. Kuroda, however, suggests that *so-* can also be used deictically in soliloquy. Suppose someone has been informed that he has a stomach ulcer. He wonders and says (3a). On the other hand, one morning he feels an unusual sensation in his stomach and says (3b).

(3) a. **Sore** wa donna iro o shite iru no daroo ka.
   ‘I wonder what color **that** is.’
b. Ittai **kore** wa itsu made tsuzuku no daroo.
   ‘I wonder how long **this** will last.’

Utterance (3a) is based on hearsay information, while (3b) is based on the speaker’s direct experience. Kuroda declares that both deictic and anaphoric usages of *so-* and *a-* are determined by the speaker’s familiarity with the referent. He re-labels Kuno’s direct knowledge as *experiential knowledge*, and Kuno’s indirect knowledge as *conceptual knowledge*, i.e., via hearsay or inference.1 Kuroda tentatively assumes that *a-* is used if one’s knowledge about the referent is experiential, whereas *so-* is used when it is conceptual. (He eventually abandons this idea, which will be discussed in Section 5.) He presents the following counterexample to Kuno’s analysis:

(4) Boku wa Oosaka de Yamada Taroo **to iu sensei** ni osowattan da kedo, kimi mo **ano** sensei ni tsuku to ii yo.
   ‘I studied in Osaka with a professor named Taro Yamada. You should study with him [**that** professor], too.’

Like (2a), the use of *to iu sensei* ‘professor named’ in (4) indicates that the speaker assumes the addressee’s lack of knowledge of the professor; therefore, according to Kuno, *sono*, but not *ano*, must be used. However, *ano* in (4) is perfectly natural, and it conveys that the speaker knows Professor Yamada personally and well.

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1 If one knows an entity experientially, s/he is able to describe it theoretically in an infinite number of ways. For example, I can describe my mother in terms of her age, appearance, health, interests, skills, and other traits. By contrast, information about an entity obtained by some indirect means, e.g., via hearsay or inference, is inevitably conceptual, or linguistic; i.e., it is information conveyed by some communicative means. For example, if someone says to me “My high school friend Alice called me yesterday,” I acquire the knowledge that a person named Alice, probably a female, who attended the same high school as the speaker, telephoned the person yesterday, but not much more.
2. The experiment
2.1. The data
In order to explore the functions of *ko-so-a* in soliloquy in Japanese, an experiment was conducted. Twenty-four subjects (8 males and 16 females, all native speakers of Japanese) participated, each speaking his or her thoughts for 10-15 minutes while alone in an isolated room. The subjects were instructed to speak not to an imaginary person, but, rather, to simply verbalize whatever came into their minds. Other than speaking as much as they were able, they were free to walk around, look at books and magazines, and do whatever they wanted. Their soliloquies were recorded on an audio device and subsequently transcribed. A total of 3,042 utterances, many of which consist of fragmented sentences, were obtained.\(^2\) All subjects were aware that they were being recorded. First, let me present a brief discussion regarding this data-collection method lest the validity of this procedure, which might seem removed from genuine and spontaneous soliloquy, come into question.

2.2. Soliloquy defined
As a pretheoretical notion, soliloquy can be defined in three ways: *situational, intentional, or heuristic in terms of form and content*. Situationally, the term *soliloquy* refers to any utterance when no person other than the speaker is present in the speech situation. By this definition, the data to be analyzed in this study clearly qualify as authentic soliloquies because no one else was in the experiment room.

Soliloquy can also be defined based on the speaker’s intention, i.e., as manifestation of thinking that is not meant to be addressed to any other individual. With this definition, whether the speaker is alone or is surrounded by other people is irrelevant. Even if physically alone, one can speak to a particular person the speaker pretends is present and listening. Conversely, even if one is surrounded by people, one might have no intention of communicating with any of them, and, consequently, not expect any reaction from them. This notion of soliloquy is what interests me. However, with this definition, soliloquy cannot be observationally identified; only the speaker can determine whether or not an utterance is a soliloquy. It is important to note that the recording of naturally occurring soliloquies is not immune from this problem either. Therefore, if one subscribes to this notion of soliloquy, experimentally obtained data are no less qualified as genuine than are spontaneous soliloquy data.

The third way to define soliloquy is based on the form and content of the utterance. This idea, which might be alien to native speakers of English, may be applied in Japanese, where the soliloquy mode of discourse is to some extent grammaticized, although even among native speakers of Japanese the criteria that define a soliloquial utterance are admittedly murky and subjective. When Japanese speakers verbalize without expecting any reaction from their hearers, they employ certain forms and avoid certain others. Such soliloquy does not contain addressee-oriented elements, for example, (i) certain sentence-final particles (e.g., *ze* ‘I’m telling you’), (ii) directives (e.g., commands, requests, questions), (iii) vocative expressions (e.g., *oi* ‘hey’), (iv) responses (e.g., *hai* ‘yes’, *iie* ‘no’), (v) pragmatic adverbials of various sorts (e.g., *sumimasen ga* ‘excuse me, but’, *koko dake no hanashi dakedo* ‘it’s between you and me’), (vi) hearsay expressions (e.g., *(da)sooda*(da)tte ‘I hear’), and (vii) addressee honorifics (e.g., *desu/masu*). As a positive indicator, soliloquy frequently involves exclamatory interjections (e.g., *waa, maa, hee, huun*) and exclamatory sentence-final particles (e.g., *naa, kana, ya*). Therefore, when a speaker

\(^2\) To determine criteria for distinguishing sentences and/or sentence fragments, a procedure was developed based on syntactic considerations, the duration of silence, and intonation contours. As this experiment done in Japanese, word counts, a common method for analyzing English data, was not employed. In Japanese, the concept of *word* is not well established, due in part to the use of enclitic particles, agglutinative morphology, and syntactic (i.e., post-lexical) compounds. In fact, detecting word boundaries is one of the most challenging tasks in processing Japanese by computer. I therefore use the utterance as a counting unit.
uses or avoids some forms, the hearer tends to interpret the utterance as soliloquy. For example, such utterances as shown in (5) are recognized as soliloquy by most native speakers of Japanese:

   ‘Oh, I see.’
 b. Honto daroo ka.
   ‘I wonder if it’s true.’
 c. Naruhodo ne.
   ‘That makes sense.’


No matter how soliloquy is defined, spontaneous and experimentally solicited data may be deemed equally valid and equally problematic. One might argue that the real issue here is the subjects’ awareness of their being recorded, which undoubtedly restricts the content of their speech. I defend my methodology on two grounds. First, I am more interested in the form than in the content of soliloquy, and form is less susceptible to speakers’ impulse to defend confidentiality than is substance. That is, speakers use the same inventory of linguistic resources at their disposal whenever they speak. Second, recording utterances for research without subjects’ consent is prohibited in the United States and by many other nations. This applies to recording of not only soliloquies, but also conversations. We must make do with this unconditional constraint.

Surprisingly, however, most of the subjects in my experiment spoke rather freely, even referring to personal problems. I usually used my office for recording, and some subjects commented on my possessions. For instance, one subject looked around the room and found haiku (Japanese poetry) books and declared (6a); another subject talked about the scroll hanging from a wall and said (6b); the third subject commented on my Dell laptop as (6c). These subjects were sufficiently mature to refrain from expressing such negative comments in the presence of the owner of the articles.

(6) a. Uwaa, haiku toka. Aa yuu no yada.
   ‘Gee, haiku books. I don’t care for them!’
   ‘This kind of scroll is too Chinese. My family didn’t have calligraphy things at home. … I dislike calligraphy, too.’
 c. Demo, yappari, dezain wa makkintosshu no hoo ga zutto ii yonee. Deru mo waruku nain dakedo, yappari, nanka, jenerikku-tte kanji ga suru yonee. Ato, yasuku tsukutteru kara, buhin ga yasui shi nee.
   ‘Well, of course, Mac has a much better design. Dell is ok, but it looks generic. And it’s cheaply made of cheap parts.’

We must be cautious about the unusual means of data collection employed in the present study. Nevertheless, until a better method is discovered or invented, this one is deemed most practical.
3. Ko-so-a in the soliloquy data
3.1. Ko-series

Equipped with the background information provided in sections 1 and 2, we can now examine the soliloquy data, which contain 428 ko-tokens, 151 so-tokens, and 237 a-tokens. Of the 428 ko-tokens, all but two are clearly deictic, as can be seen in (7).

(7) a. [Regarding the desk chair in the office]
   A, kono isu choo-raku soo.
   ‘Oh, this chair looks super-comfortable.’

   b. Anmari koko ni kite sabishii-tte omotta koto nai kedo, koo yatte heya ni hitori de hitorigoto wa ya da naa.
   ‘I’ve seldom felt lonely since I came here, but I don’t like being alone this way, in a room, talking to myself.’

The two problematic ko-cases are presented in (8).

(8) a. Maa, aarudeko no ii no ga attara, hoshii kedo, maa, kore wa kinagani yaroo.
   ‘Well, if there’s a good one in the Art Deco style, I want it, but I think I’ll take more time with this [purchase].’

   b. Getsuyoobi madeni shinakucha ikenai no ga, eeto, a, soo da. E o kaite morau koto to, ato wa nanka atta kana. Aa, soo soo soo, kondo no kuizu no mondai o tsukuru koto. Kore o yattokanakya ikenai kana.
   ‘What I have to do by Monday is … Oh, yes, I need to have someone draw pictures, and is there anything else? Oh, yes, yes, yes, make the next quiz. I think I need to do this.’

Kuno (1973: 288) contends that when ko- appears to be anaphoric, it is actually “indicating something as if it were visible to both the speaker and the hearer at the time of the conversation, and thus it imparts vividness to the conversation.” The speaker of (8a) had been shopping for an ottoman (chair) and was browsing a catalog while recording her speech. Kore in this utterance refers to the abstract concept of shopping, which is not visibly present in the speech situation. Therefore, it is not an obvious case of deixis. Nevertheless, kore refers to “the activity I’m engaged in now,” namely, buying a chair. Because the concept now is involved, it is appropriately categorized as deictic. In (8b), the speaker was listing things that she needed to accomplish by the following Monday. Again, it seems more appropriate to analyze the kore as referring deictically to the specific item on her mental list.

In dialogue, this can be used cataphorically, for example,

(9) I think you’ll be interested in this. Yesterday, our supervisor was seen …

However, there are no instances of cataphoric ko- in my soliloquy data. It is, therefore, reasonable to consider cataphora to be a deictic phenomenon observable only in communicative settings. The speaker places an imaginary package in front of the audience and refers to it with the demonstrative ko-. Then the package is opened. This is a presentational technique, irrelevant in soliloquy because when the speaker uses ko-, the referent is already activated in his/her brain.
3.2. So-series

Regarding the so-series, all of the 151 tokens are clearly anaphoric. Although Kuroda’s stomach ulcer episode illustrating the possibility of deictic so- (3a) is logically possible, such usage seems to be extremely rare. This absence of deictic so- suggests that the Distance Model (proximal ko-, medial so-, distal a-) does not operate in soliloquy. All recording sessions were conducted in a small office. Several subjects mentioned the scroll that was hanging on the wall a few feet from where they were seated. Some used ko- to refer to it, while others used a-, as in (10). These data support the Territory Model; i.e., so-refers to an entity in an addressee’s territory, but, because no addressee is involved, so- is immaterial.

(10) Ano kakejiku wa dare ga kaita no kanaa.
‘I wonder who did that scroll.’

The anaphoric use of so- is considered next. Subtracting the addressee from Kuno’s analysis, we assume that so- is used when the speaker does not know the referent well, and that a- is used when s/he knows the referent well. Some so-utterances appear to support Kuno’s analysis, as in (11).

(11)a. Sankanbi ja nakute, bunkasai ja nakute, aa, namea wasureta. Eeto, oyako, oyako nantoka. Ee, nande sonna kotoba wasurerun yaro. 6-nenkan mainen atta noni.
‘Not a [parents’] observation day, not an open house, oh, I forgot what we called it [a school event]. Hmm, parent-child, parent-child something. How could I forget such a [that kind of] word? We had one every year for 6 years …’

‘Well, compared with other persons’ soliloquies, mine must sound very childish. That’s embarrassing. … Is this kind of chatting OK? But mine is in the Kansai dialect, so it must be difficult to transcribe. To listen to the tape and transcribe it all is tiresome. Isn’t there a machine like that available yet?’

In (11), we can easily infer that the speakers do not know the referents well. However, the majority of so-tokens do not conform to Kuno’s analysis, as in (12).

(12)a. Soo da, pasokon ga kowarechatta kara, sono shuuri mo moshiki dekitara shitai shi.
‘Oh, yeah, my computer has broken down, so, if possible, I want to fix it [that] too.’

‘Japan is small. Very tight. Everyone is stylish, strange and useless. But that might be a good point.’

c. … ippai e o kaita kara, ano e o doo shiyou kanaaa. … Natsuyasumi ni chotto e no seiri o shita hoo ga ii kamo shirenai. … demo tsukaenai e wa doo shitara ii no kanaaa. Demo suteru no wa mottainai kara, un, sore wa dokka ni sutoa suru ka.
‘I drew a lot of pictures. What shall I do with them? Should I sort them during the summer? What should I do with the unusable ones? Discarding them would be wasteful, so maybe I should store them [those] somewhere.’
In (12a), *sono* refers to the speaker’s own computer. Similarly, *sore* in (12b) refers to the penchant for striving to be fashionable, the speaker’s own characterization of the Japanese people. In (12c), the speaker had created many illustrations as teaching materials and wondered what to do with them. The *sore* refers here to her own drawings. These examples demonstrate that, contrary to Kuno, *so-* can be used to refer to a familiar entity.

### 3.3. *a-* series

The *a-* series occurred 237 times. As shown in (13), *a-* can accompany an antecedent (underlined), and can therefore be considered anaphoric:

(13)a. [Wondering which car her in-laws would buy]
   Okaasan rekusasu ki ni itteru yoo datta kedo, demo are wa okkii kuruma da shi nee.
   ‘Mother seemed to like the Lexus, but it’s a big car.’

b. [Thinking about her in-laws, who were visiting Lake Tahoe at the time of the recording]
   Nee, ima wa Reeku Taho de nani shiten daro. Tenki ii to ii ne, atchi.
   ‘What are they doing at Lake Tahoe? I hope the weather there is good.’

However, *a-* also occurs frequently without any antecedent:

(14)a. Aaa, kyoo mo hare. Ashita mo hare, ashita mo hare hen kana. Ashita haretara, ano sandaru hako.
   ‘Well, it’s a beautiful day today. Tomorrow, I hope the weather will be fine again tomorrow. If it’s fine, I’ll wear those sandals.’

b. Itsu datta kana, saigo ni sazae tabeta no wa. Moo sootoo mushiki no hanashi da ne. Ne, Aoshima no umi ni itte, uchi no okaasan to ootoo to sazae tabete, suika-warite shite. Are, nantetta kana, are. Are, nooryoo basu da, nooryoo basu.
   ‘When did I eat sazae [a type of shellfish] last time? It’s a long time ago. Well, I went to Aoshima Beach with mom and my brother and ate sazae. Then we had a watermelon bust. What’s that called, that one? Night-sightseeing bus, yeah, night-sightseeing bus.’

c. [Looking at a magazine]
   Kore, are da. Zenmai da.
   ‘This is that. A flowering fern.’

*a-* in (14) seem to be deictic, although the referents are not visibly present in the speech situation. While the speakers were soliloquizing, a certain entity apparently emerged in their consciousness, and they referred to it deictically with *a-*.

A question arises as to whether (13) and (14) are distinct, (13) being anaphoric and (14) being deictic. Considering the speakers’ minds, both seem to function in the same way, regardless of the entities having been introduced linguistically prior to the use of *a-*.

A- in soliloquy into deictic and anaphoric according to the presence or absence of an antecedent is cognitively arbitrary, I analyze both of them straightforwardly as deictic. I also conjecture that even in conversation,
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is always deictic, pointing to a speaker’s mental construct.

Mikami (1970/1992) speculated on this possibility, arguing that a- is always deictic, referring to an entity at a distance commonly perceived by both the speaker and addressee in either space or time. Arguing counter to Mikami, Kuno (1973/1992: 73) emphasizes that Mikami’s account cannot predict differences such as were illustrated in (2a, b).

(2) a. Kinoo Yamada-san to iu hito ni aimashita. Sono (#Ano) hito michi ni mayotte komatte ita node, tasukete agemashita.
   ‘Yesterday, I met a man named Yamada. Because he [that person] was having difficulty finding his way, I helped him.’

   ‘Yesterday, I met Mr. Yamada. He [that person] is always in great spirits.’

Furthermore, Kuno questions how we are able to determine whether something is at a commonly perceived distance. If two people were born in 1960, Kuno continues, can we refer to that year as ano toshi ‘that year?’ His response is “no, we cannot.”

I contend, with Kuroda, that the variant effects of a- and so-, such as in (2a, b), can only be accounted for in terms of the act of communication. In this regard, Kinsui and Takubo (1992) consider that the anomaly of ano in (2a) is due not to the speaker’s assumption of the addressee’s lack of knowledge of Yamada, but, rather, to its asocial nature. Kinsui and Takubo contend (though I disagree with this characterization) that the ano in (2a) is anaphoric, indicating that the speaker’s knowledge of the referent is experiential, à la Kuroda. If the addressee is unlikely to know the referent, they continue, to suggest one’s knowledge as experiential is not only useless, but alienating as well.

This line of explanation can be adapted to include the idea that ano in (2a) is pointing to a mental construct. Unless the addressee has the same construct in mind, its use is communicatively ill-suited. Bringing the same entity into the addressee’s consciousness can be accomplished by a prior mention (an antecedent in anaphora), pointing to its presence in the speech situation (deixis), or some other means. However, I contend that the selection of a- is not directly controlled by such means.

3.4. Deictic ko- and a- compared

Let us now reexamine the utterances in (8).

(8) a. Maa, aarudeko no ii no ga attara, hoshii kedo, maa, kore wa kinagani yaroo.
   ‘Well, if there’s a good one in the Art Deco style, I want it, but I think I’ll take more time with this [purchase].’

b. Getsuyoobi madeni shinakucha ikenai no ga, eeto, a, soo da. E o kaite morau koto to, ato wa nanka atta kana. Aa, soo soo soo, kondo no kuizu no mondai o tsukuru koto. Kore o yattokanakya ikenai kana.
   ‘What I have to do by Monday is … Oh, yes, I need to have someone draw pictures, and is there anything else? Oh, yes, yes, yes, make the next quiz. I think I need to do this.’

Interestingly, in (8), all of ko-so-a could be used, and they would convey different mental states. The speaker of (8a) had been shopping for an ottoman chair and was browsing a catalog while recording her speech. In this situation, only kore, which refers to “the activity I’m engaged in now,” viz. catalog shopping, is appropriate. Therefore, as Kuno remarks, although it might not appear so, this type of usage of ko- should be judged deictic. If sore were employed, it would indicate that the speaker is thinking about the
activity of shopping, and that she is not physically engaged in it at the time of utterance. The *sore* in such a case should be considered genuinely anaphoric. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which *are* would be used. One possible scenario would be that the speaker remembers various shopping trips she has made to furniture stores in the past, and the utterance would indicate that she will continue making such trips. Rather than anaphoric, this use of *a-* sounds deictic.

In (8b), the speaker was listing things that she needed to accomplish by the following Monday. Again, it seems more appropriate to analyze the *kore* as referring deictically to the specific item on her mental list. If *sore* were used, it would be clearly anaphoric, and the image of pointing to a specific item on the list that *kore* evokes would disappear. Instead, *sore* would then be understood to refer to the list itself. *Are* could also be used here and would sound deictic. It would sound like pointing, not to the to-do list just mentioned but, rather, to something new that has emerged in the speaker’s mind.

Although both *ko-* and *a-* are always deictic, they are not in free variation. To account for the difference between *ko-* and *a-*, Chafe’s (1994) model of consciousness is helpful. Chafe defines consciousness as “an active focusing on a small part of the conscious being’s self-centered model of the surrounding world” (p. 28). While one can arouse such grand experiential totalities as one’s father or one’s years as an undergraduate student, no one can be conscious all at once of their entire internal composition. That is, one can focus only on a particular image or action of one’s father, or on a particular person, place, or event within one’s undergraduate days (ibid.). Most of consciousness is made up of experiences of perceptions and actions, concomitant with co-occurring emotions, opinions, attitudes, desires, and decisions (p. 31).

Chafe perceives consciousness to be like vision, constantly in motion and able to focus on a very limited amount of information at one time. Like foveal (i.e., sharp, central) vision, there is focal consciousness, and like peripheral vision, there is peripheral consciousness, providing a context for that which is focused. A vast amount of information lies beyond peripheral consciousness, which is not attended to at any given moment. Information in the focal, peripheral, or unconscious state is referred to as *active, semiactive, or inactive*, respectively (p. 53). Active and inactive information can be considered to correspond to short-term and long-term memory, respectively, but Chafe prefers not to use these terms because of the implication that memory is a *place*. He argues that relevant phenomena can be better captured in terms of activation, not by considering something to be in memory or to be retrieved from memory (ibid.).

Suppose a certain point in time, \( t_1 \), and a later time, \( t_2 \). Suppose also that at \( t_2 \), a certain idea is active. If it was already active at \( t_1 \), it is considered *given* information at \( t_2 \). If it was semiactive at \( t_1 \), it is considered *accessible* information, and if it was inactive at \( t_1 \), it is considered *new* information at \( t_2 \) (pp.72-73). There are three cases when semiactive information is activated at \( t_2 \): a referent (i) was active at an earlier time in the discourse, e.g., (15a); (ii) is directly associated with an idea that is or was active in the discourse, e.g., (15b); and (iii) is associated with the nonlinguistic environment of the discourse, e.g., (15c) (pp.86-87).

(15a) Jennifer thinks she’s got a kidney infection.
   b. … but then your back’s ((a brief pause)) gets sway back.
   c. Well the kid’s asleep.

Regarding (15a), the referent of *Jennifer* was active previously in the conversation. The idea expressed by *your back* in (15b) had not been mentioned in the preceding conversation, but because the talk was about backaches, backs were semiactive. In (15c), the referent of *the kid* was accessible because s/he was present in the environment.
Now recall Kuroda’s (tentative) contention that a- is used if one’s knowledge of the referent is experiential, whereas so- is used when it is conceptual, i.e., obtained via some means of communication. After analyzing my soliloquy data, it appears that information about how a piece of knowledge was obtained was immaterial. The following is a constructed example to illustrate this point:

(16) Ano/#Kono hito dare nan daroo, kinoo Okada-san ga hanashiteta hito.
    ‘Who is that person? The one that Okada was talking about yesterday?’

In (16), the speaker wonders about the identity of the person that Okada had mentioned the day before. Here, the speaker does not personally know the referent, with his/her knowledge being obtained only linguistically (i.e., conceptually in terms of words or phrases) from Okada. Therefore, according to Kuroda, a- should be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the use of a- in (16) sounds quite plausible. I hypothesize that a- can be used deictically to refer to an entity if it is in one’s peripheral consciousness and thus in a semiotic state. Exactly what mental construct ano deictically points to in this case is unclear. If I place myself in this situation, the mental imagery of the conversation with Okada is likely to come to my mind, but not the image of the person in question. Because the speaker of (16) does not know the person, that person him/herself cannot be totally activated, and therefore s/he is referred to by ano.

On the other hand, the use of ko- in (16) would sound unnatural. I therefore hypothesize that ko- is used to refer deictically to an entity only if it is focused and thus in an active state at the moment of speech. Example (17) is another constructed utterance. Here, both kore and are can be used. Intuitively, the task that is the speaker remembers is more clearly recognized when kore, rather than are, is selected.

    ‘What do I have to do tomorrow? Oh, yeah, the minutes. It’ll take time.’

For another example, recall utterance (14c):

(14)c. [Looking at a magazine]
    Kore, are da. Zenmai da.
    ‘This is that. A flowering fern.’

Here, the speaker looked at a picture in a cookbook and referred to it as kore. She then recognized that she knew what it was. At this moment, because the entity in her mind was still in peripheral consciousness, she identified it deictically as are. Immediately after this utterance, the entity in her mind became focused, and she could identify it with its name zenmai ‘flowering fern.’

Likewise, we can modify (14b) to show the movement from peripheral to central consciousness. In (18a), riding a night-sightseeing bus is referred to by a- and then by ko-. This movement is natural, as it reflects the speaker’s mental activity of delving into her memory and focusing on the events. The speaker does not have to change from a- to ko-, i.e., a- can be used throughout. However, the point here is that shifting from ko- to a- is anomalous, as shown in (18b).

(18)a. … Are, nantetta kana, are. Are, nooryoo basu da, nooryoo basu. Demo kono nooryoo basu de itsumo mometan da yonee. Dare ga doko ni suwaru ka de.
    ‘What’s that called, that one? Night-sightseeing bus, yeah, night sightseeing bus. Yeah, we always had trouble with these night-sightseeing buses, about who should sit where.’

The hypothesis that *a*- is used to refer to an entity in a semiactive state provides a clue to understanding the bewildering functions of *a*-.

Although *a*- can be used to refer to something located in the distance, it is also frequently used for an entity with which the speaker is familiar, as argued by Kuno (1973) and Kuroda (1979/1992) in their analyses of *a*- as referring to a familiar piece of information (based on experiential knowledge). The association of familiarity/experiential knowledge with *ko*-(proximal) would be intuitive, because familiar things are metaphorically close to one’s self. By contrast, the construal of familiarity with distal *a*- is perplexing. We may understand the connection between *a*- and familiarity if we consider the referent of *a*- to be distal in the sense that it is in peripheral consciousness, but, at the same time, it is familiar because it is included in one’s model of the surrounding world (permanent memory) and therefore can be focused at will.

4. The notions of deixis and anaphora reconsidered

It has so far been argued that in soliloquy *ko*- and *a*- are always deictic—*ko*- referring to an active entity, and *a*- referring to a semiactive entity in the speaker’s mind. By contrast, *so*- is invariably anaphoric. But are deixis and anaphora so clearly discernible?

Lyons (1977: 672) discusses a case similar to the problem posed by (13) and (14). That is, if there is a potential antecedent, the expression should be considered anaphoric, but if there is no antecedent, it must be treated as deictic. Consider:

(19)a. I was terribly upset to hear the news: I saw her only last week.
   b. I know Mrs Smith very well: I saw her only last week.

In (19a), the speaker offers condolences to a friend whose wife has just been killed in a car accident. Lyons determines that both (19a, b) are anaphoric:

Many scholars … would say that the reference of ‘she’ in [19a] is deictic, rather than anaphoric, on the grounds that it involves pointing to something in the intersubjective experience or common memory of speaker and addressee, rather than to something in the external situational context … It is obvious, however, that the notion of intersubjective experience, or common memory, is the more general notion, without which anaphoric reference, as it is traditionally conceived, cannot be explained. (Lyons 1977: 672)

This criticism also applies to my analysis of *ko-so-a* appearing in soliloquy. That is, mental imagery that I propose in the case of their deictic use is a more general notion, and such an image is likely to be present even in the process of genuine anaphora. We will come back to this issue shortly. Regarding the distinction between deixis and anaphora, Lyons (1977: 673) proposes a functional definition, vis-à-vis structural definition:

Anaphora presupposes that the referent should already have its place in the universe-of-discourse. Deixis does not; indeed deixis is one of the principal means open to us of putting entities into the universe-of-discourse so that we can refer to them subsequently …
It has been widely acknowledged that anaphora can occur without an antecedent, as exemplified by (20). Unlike *her* in (19), the pronominal *it* cannot be used deictically; when one eats a candy, one cannot normally say *I like it*. Therefore, even though there is no antecedent, *it* in (20) is unambiguously anaphoric.

(20) [A and B turn a corner, and suddenly find themselves face to face with a large dog. A says to B.]
Do you think it’s friendly? (Cornish 1996: 19)

Cornish argues that anaphora is not necessarily an intra-textual relationship between two linguistic expressions, but, rather, it serves to access and manage mentally-represented entities within the evolving discourse. Following Lyons, he considers that deixis prototypically serves to shift the addressee’s attention from an existing object to a new one derived via the situational context. Anaphora, on the other hand, guarantees the continuation of the focus of attention already established in the conversation. He contends that unstressed, low-pitched third person pronouns are always anaphoric regardless of the presence or absence of an antecedent. The speaker presupposes that their referents are salient (i.e., stand out from their background context and are readily accessible to the addressee) at the point of utterance. Such salience may be sanctioned by explicit prior mention in the co-text (linguistic antecedent), by an inference triggered by a given mention, or by direct mutual perception of a feature of the situational context. In any case, anaphora works not in the co-text or the physical situational context, but within a conceptual representation in the minds of the speaker and addressee where the referent is located and accessed. To support this claim, Cornish (1996: 25) provides (21):

(21) Le ministre de l’Education Nationale est en vacances. Elle sejournera deux semaines au bord de la mer.
‘The Education Minister (masc.) is on holiday. She (fem.) will spend two weeks at the seaside.’

*Le ministre de l’Education Nationale* is grammatically masculine, but the anaphor reflects the fact that the referent is female. This demonstrates that the anaphor is referring not by linking up directly with the antecedent expression per se, but via a mental representation induced by its antecedent.

Cornish further claims that the notions of *deixis* and *anaphora* are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are interdefining and interdependent discourse procedures. He asserts that there is a cline, with pure deixis at the one end, pure anaphora at the other, and various degrees of deicticity and anaphoricity in between.

With this new conceptualization of deixis and anaphora in mind, we are prepared to re-examine (13) and (14). There are three possibilities: (i) examples in (13) are anaphoric, whereas those in (14) are deictic; (ii) both are anaphoric; (iii) both are deictic. As discussed above, (i) is the least desirable because it is difficult to assume that the use of *a-* reflects different mental states of the speaker. Nor does it result from different discourse strategies, because they occurred in soliloquy. Between (ii) and (iii), (ii) is eliminated because, as before, while (13) can be judged anaphoric, (14) cannot be analyzed as such even with the new conceptualization of anaphoricity. *The sandals* in (14a), for example, had not been established as a focus of attention prior to the utterance. Nor is there any trigger that induces the referent entity in the co-text or situational context. Its image suddenly occurred in the speaker’s mind, and *a-* points to it deictically. I therefore affirm (iii): all occurrences of *a-* should be considered deictic rather than anaphoric.

Justification of this claim is found, somewhat indirectly, by considering the bound variable interpretation of demonstratives. In this case, the demonstratives are not referential, and therefore cannot be deictic. Consider this constructed example:
(22) Watashi ga umareta machi de wa, dono kooen ni mo sakura no ki ga ari, *kono/sono/*ano iriguchi wa, torii no katachi o shiteita.
‘In my hometown, every park had cherry trees, and its entrance was like an archway to a Shinto shrine.’

As shown in (22), only so- can be used as a bound-variable anaphor.³ This inability to function as a bound variable is consistent with the contention that ko- and a- are always deictic.⁴

In this regard, Hoji et al. (2003) draw our attention to an interesting combinatorial restriction. Recall Mikami’s discovery that phrases combining a- and ko- as well as so- and ko- are possible, but not a- and so-, cf. (1). With an interrogative expression, do-, only so- can appear:

(23) do- + so- dare-sore ‘Mr./Ms/Mrs. so-and-so’, doko-soko ‘such and such a place’
do- + ko- none
do- + a- none

Hoji et al. cite this fact as evidence that only so- can function as a free variable. Disappointingly, however, do- and ko- can be combined:

(24) doitsu mo koitsu mo ‘anybody’; dore mo kore mo ‘anything’; doo-koo iu tsumori wa nai ‘I have nothing to say’; doonika-koonika ‘somehow’; dooyara-kooyara ‘somehow’

5. Why anaphora in soliloquy?
We have observed that in soliloquy ko- and a- are consistently deictic, freely pointing to a mental construct regardless of continuation or renewal of a topic of discourse. On the other hand, so- is an anaphor par excellence, always accompanied by an antecedent. It is understandable that in order to carry a conversation, one needs to evoke in the interlocutor’s mind a certain mental imagery that s/he wants to talk about. This evocation can be accomplished by identifying the entity by means of an antecedent. But why is this rhetorical procedure necessary in soliloquy? Everything that the speaker wishes to talk about is accessible; therefore, establishing an antecedent is superfluous. The existence of so- as an anaphoric device in soliloquy turns out to be mysterious.

In this section, I explore the possibility of accounting for the so- and a- demonstratives in a way different from the deixis-anaphora dichotomy. As mentioned in Section 1, Kuroda (1979/1992) first assumed that a- is used if one’s knowledge about the referent is experiential, whereas so- is used when it is conceptual, i.e., based on hearsay or inference. He eventually abandoned this idea and concluded that selection between the two is not based on the speaker’s familiarity with the referent, but, rather, on the basis of presentation, i.e., whether the speaker wishes to present the referent as an experiential object or as a conceptual object (p.102). As this part of Kuroda’s analysis is difficult to make out, I would like to invoke Donnellan’s (1966) idea of referencing.⁵

He contends that a definite description may be used either referentially or attributively. When the speaker expects the addressee to pick out the object by uttering a definite description, it is said to be

³ This fact is also reported by other researchers: Hoji et al. 2003, Ueyama 1998, among others.
⁴ Nunberg (1993) demonstrates that deictics can also serve as bound variables. For example, a condemned prisoner can say I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal (I = any condemned prisoner), or a President can say The Founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court justices (me = any President). Rullmann (2004) also discusses bound variable interpretation of first- and second- plural pronouns, e.g. Every woman, I, date wants us, to get married. However, it is impossible to use deictic expressions in this manner in Japanese.
⁵ I am indebted to Yukinori Takubo for inspiring me to associate Kuroda’s conceptual object with attributive interpretation.
referential, whereas when the speaker wishes to assert something about whoever or whatever fits that
description, it is said to be attributive. For example, suppose one sees a person holding a martini glass at a
party and asks “Who is the man drinking a martini?” If it should turn out that the person is drinking water,
not a martini, one can nonetheless get someone to answer. This is a referential use of “the man drinking a
martini.” On the other hand, suppose the chairperson of the local Teetotalers Union (practicing complete
abstinence from alcoholic drinks), having just been informed that a man is drinking a martini, asks the
same question. If no one is drinking a martini, no person can be singled out. This is an attributive use of the
description (p.287).

Let us re-examine (12c), which contains both a- and so-:

(12)c. … ippai e o kaita kara, ano e o doo shiyoo kanaa. … Natsuyasumi ni chotto e no seiri o shita hoo ga
ii kamo shirenai. … demo tsukaenai e wa doo shitara ii no kanaa. Demo suteru no wa mo mottainai
kara, un, sore wa dokka ni sutoa suru ka.
‘I drew a lot of pictures. What shall I do with them [those]? Should I sort them during the summer?
What should I do with the unusable ones? Discarding them would be wasteful, so maybe I should
store them [those] somewhere.’

In terms of Donnellan’s referentiality, ano e ‘those pictures’ can be analyzed as referential, pointing to a
mental image in a semiactive state. By contrast, sore is to be considered attributive, whatever fits the
description tsukaenai e ‘unusable pictures’.

If we interpret Kuroda’s notion of conceptual object as an attributive description, my data support
Kuroda’s analysis. A- is used when the expression is intended to be referential, while so- is selected when
the expression is intended to be attributive.

6. Conclusions
After a brief summary of traditional analyses of the ko-so-a series, wherein the Distance, Territory, and
Double-Binary Models were introduced, the present paper considered the two functions of these
demonstratives: deictic and anaphoric. So- and a- are said to be used in either way, but ko- can be used only
deuictically. For Kuno (1973), so- is selected anaphorically (i) when the speaker does not know the referent
well or (ii) when the speaker knows the referent well but s/he assumes that the addressee does not. By
contrast, a- is selected when the speaker assumes that both s/he and the addressee know the referent well.
Kuroda (1979/1992) disagrees with Kuno and claims that while so- is used when the speaker has only
conceptual knowledge of the referent, a- is used when the speaker’s knowledge of the referent is
experiential. These characterizations are, however, not supported by my experimental data.

Analyzing the data, it was discussed that (i) ko-so-a occur frequently in soliloquy, and (ii) while all
of ko-so-a can be used deictically in dialogue, so- is not used deictically in soliloquy. That is, the Territory
Model is applicable (so- is not used because no addressee’s territory exists), but the Distance Model
(proximal ko-, medial so-, distal a-) is irrelevant.

Ko- and a- occur in soliloquy, each with or without an antecedent. However, dividing their
occurrences into the categories of deixis and anaphora according to the mere presence or absence of an
antecedent was deemed arbitrary. Therefore, I argue that both should be analyzed straightforwardly as
deictic even when the referents are not visibly present in the speech situation. When a certain mental
construct emerges in his/her consciousness, the speaker refers to it deictically with ko- or a-. Adopting
Chafe’s (1994) theory of consciousness, I hypothesize that (i) a- is used deictically when the referent is in
the speaker’s peripheral consciousness, i.e., in a semiactive mental state, and (ii) ko- is used to refer
deictically to an entity if it is already focused and thus in an active state at the moment of speech.
Section 4 was a discussion of the fact that the distinction between deictic and anaphoric uses of pronouns cannot be viewed as clear-cut because anaphora does not always require an antecedent. And we considered Lyons’ characterization of that distinction: anaphora is used to refer to an entity that has already been introduced in the universe of discourse, whereas deixis normally introduces a new entity. This new characterization was applied to the data. However, the re-examination failed to resolve the problematic occurrences of a-. At present, there is no evidence for positing two different types of mental activity on the part of the speaker. By contrast, some instances are not anaphoric by any definition of anaphoricity. It was, therefore, decided to maintain the hypothesis that all occurrences of a- are deictic.

Finally, in Section 5, the uses of so- and a- were compared in terms of Donnellan’s (1966) referential-attributive distinction. It was claimed that the speaker presents an entity with so- when s/he wishes to use the expression attributively. On the other hand, a- is selected when the speaker wishes to refer to a mental construct in a semiactive state. When such a mental construct is focused, i.e., already in an active state, ko- is used to reference it.

References


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